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To The Corporate Pilot Who Suffers From Substance Abuse & Dependence

ABSTRACT
Safety is a critical issues facing aviation today. The health of the pilot and the
policies related to pilot well-being greatly contribute to the safety practices of flight. The
purpose of this research study was to assess the status quo of unmandated, written alcohol
and drug policies of corporate/executive flight departments operating under Part 91 of the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs). Researchers found 68% of these operators had
written general alcohol/drug, 20% had rehabilitation and 15% had job retention/recovery
policies in place. Statistical tests showed that for each pilot added to the flight operation
the odds of having a general alcohol/drug policy in place increased by 1.4 times. A
strong statistical connectivity was uncovered between how important the policy is
perceived to be by the leader and whether or not written policies are in place.
Ultimately, this data supports that a need exists for further education of industry
professionals of the resources available. The vast majority (94%) of leaders were
unaware of resources or where to obtain them and nearly one-quarter reported having
direct experience with these issues among the pilots in their flight operations.
Furthermore, our research was an endeavor to aid those in our industry affected by
substance abuse and dependence issues. Finally, this study upholds the aviation
industry’s goal of achieving increased safety by establishing industry best practices of
instituting written alcohol and drug policies.

x

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the post September 11th 2001 economy of the business aviation
industry has experienced tremendous growth both in more efficient utilization of aircraft
and expansion of new and existing flight operations. Industry exerts speculate this
growth is driven by a combination of growing national economy, degraded convenience
of commercial airline travel, and the increased emphasis on safety, security and
efficiency to the business traveler. The ensuing decade projections show that business
aviation will only continue to strengthen with a booming economic forecast. Richard
Aboulafia of the Teal Group, an aerospace and defense industry consulting and analysis
firm projects delivery of 12,000 business jets worth $173.2 billion in 2007 dollars
through the next 10 years (2007-2016). Additionally, these projections do not include 424
corporate jetliners and regional jets worth an additional $12.3 billion (Burnside, 2007).
Furthermore, while experiencing industry segment expansion corporate/executive
and business aircraft operators thus far have accumulated the best safety records of any
segment of General Aviation. In fact, recently corporate/executive operators (a subpopulation of business aviation) have compiled a safety record comparable to that of
scheduled FAR Part 121 airlines, which historically has experienced the lowest rate of
accidents in aviation. Corporate aviation (defined by safety analyst Robert E. Breiling
Associates as all aircraft types flown for business by salaried crews) had its safest year in
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2003 in terms of accident rates (accidents per 100,000 flight hours) and its safety record
was better than the scheduled airlines in every year during the last decade (Gilbert, 2006).
However, corporate/executive (professionally flown) aviation continues to
experience safety challenges. In the first nine months of 2005 business aviation aircraft
where involved in 48 accidents, 13 which were responsible for 43 deaths (Business
Aviation, 2005). Contrarily, in 2003, statistics show that one of the best
corporate/executive (professionally flown) accident records ever – 0.028 accidents and
0.014 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours. Business aviation (non-professionally
flown) compiled in 2003 its best record ever – 0.95 accidents per 100,000 flight hours
(NBAA, 2004b). In personal communications with Robert E. Breiling Associates, FAR
Part 91 Corporate/Executive flight operations which comprise more than 25,000 jets and
turboprops experienced per 100,000 flight hours an overall accident rate of 0.14 and a
0.011 fatal accident rate in 2006. Although historically corporate/executive operations
have compiled an accident rate comparable to the airlines, the business aviation
community has seen a dramatic increase in media exposure of high profile accidents.
The media in the United States is particularly fascinated with high net-worth individuals
and celebrities which are serviced by business aviation. This coupled with continued
fatal and non-fatal accidents and incidents, and increased negative media exposure
regarding the safety of the business aviation community, it is important for the growing
community of business aviation to examine the reasons for accidents and incidents.
For aviation as a whole, at the root of most accidents and incidents is the human
factor. According to a study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO),
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While a broad range of factors contribute to general aviation accidents, the
majority of them are associated with pilot error. According to our analysis of the
National Transportation Safety Board’s (NTSB) accident data, 80 percent of the
fatal accidents and 72 percent of the nonfatal accidents that occurred between
1994 and 1998 involved pilot error. Previous studies have found that between 60
and 80 percent of general aviation accidents are associated with pilot error (GAO,
2001).
This statistic uses primary causal factors to determine human error but does not
include human error that was a secondary or latent error casual factor. When this statistic
is examined from the narrowed perspective inclusive of the latent error, the statistic of 80
percent of aircraft accidents attributed to human error is likely a conservatively low
figure.
One issue within the human factors arena that is of particular concern is the use of
drugs and alcohol among the pilot population. Great strides in national policy and
education have been made by the FAA in the area of alcohol and drugs. In the last 40
years, general aviation accidents directly attributable to alcohol and drugs using have
dropped significantly. According to Lacefield, fatal civilian aviation accidents for 196874 showed 19.5 percent of deceased pilots revealed a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) level
of 15mg% (Lacefield, 1975). In a later study, Ross and Ross reported a statistical review
of the NTSB’s accident reports involving alcohol. In that review, it was found that for
the period 1975-1981, 10.5 percent of fatally injured general aviation pilots were
conclusively alcohol positive (Ross, 1988). In the latest data received May 2007 in
personal communications with the NTSB, four accidents in the last 10 years (1997-2006)
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have involved reportable substances specific to the corporate/executive flight operations
sector.
The corporate/executive segment of general aviation continues to prosper, while it
experiences one of the lowest accident rates in the industry. Furthermore, the trend data
of accidents and incidents show a decreasing reported toxicology as a casual factor.
However, little is known about corporate/executive operators’ internal company policies
and programs regarding drugs and alcohol. Professor Christopher Cook of the University
of Kent indicated in his 1997 survey of commercial aviation policies on alcohol and
drugs says, “In the aviation environment, there certainly has not been a failure to form
policy, nor has there been evidence that policies are ineffective. However, there does
appear to have been a failure to subject such policies to scientific study,” (Cook, 1997).
Even in the midst of positive economic trends and decreasing accidents, corporate
flight operations and their pilots are not immune to substance abuse issues. According to
Dr. Quay Snyder, statistically, drug and alcohol abuse affects the pilot population in the
same proportion as other professional occupations – approximately 8-to 10 percent. The
major concern however is that the majority of abusers are undiscovered and under
reported.
Dr. Snyder in his article FAA-Sanctioned Pilot Alcohol Abuse Programs in
Business Aviation points out that,
Alcohol and other substances that affect the mind impair the ability to think
clearly, react quickly, anticipate dynamic environments and handle complex tasks.
Effective Crew Resource Management (CRM) activities are inhibited by the
rigidity in decision-making and self-centered behavior of the alcoholic. Even the
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pilot who is completely sober is plagued by decreased mental function and
abilities months after the removal of alcohol. The compromised abilities are often
so subtle as not to be noticed, but remain very significant in the complex, multitasking world of aviation (Snyder, 2004).
According to the FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute’s Alcohol and Flying,
approximately 12 percent of all pilots in fatal general aviation accidents over a seven year
period had measurable amounts of alcohol in their blood at the time of their death.
Potentially however, fatal accidents do occur as a result of pilots who have been impaired
by the after effects of alcohol or drugs which can not be measured in the bloodstream
post-mortem (Civil Aeromedical Institute, n.d.).
Problem
Many U.S. commercial carriers have voluntarily instituted written company
policies and programs addressing drug and alcohol that also include rehabilitation and job
recovery programs of aircrew members since the mid 1970’s. Since that time there has
been a steady increase in the use and success of these programs. However, in the
business aviation sector of FAR Part 91 corporate/executive operations, there is little
known about the quantity and quality of internal policies addressing alcohol and drugs,
including those which may address the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery programs
for pilots. There are notable differences in the cultural environments between the
commercial and corporate/executive flying that may be attributing factors to this
knowledge base. Some of these differences between these industry segments include
market size, density and maturity; amount of regulatory oversight; required
corporate/personnel privacy and security; limited access to and availability of this type of
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flying; and the mission: revenue generating versus organizational support (business cost
center). Additionally, although substance abuse is thought to not vary dependent upon
profession or subpopulation, statistical information of reported frequency is available
from commercial carriers which have these voluntary policies and programs. Little is
known about the frequency of suspicion and addressing professional pilot substance
abuse and dependency in FAR Part 91 corporate/executive operations. More data is
required.
Research Questions and Hypothesis
For U.S. FAR Part 91 corporate/executive flight operations:
1) What is the prevalence of written alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) policies for pilots in place?
2) How important are having written alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) policies for pilots in place to leaders?
3) What is the prevalence of leaders’ suspicion of and/or addressing alcohol/drug
issues with pilots?
4) How familiar are leaders with the FAA’s HIMS program?
5) How receptive are leaders to implementing an alcohol/drug policy that
includes job retention/recovery and rehabilitation components?
6) What factors predict whether or not a flight operation has a written
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policy for
pilots in place?
This research study expects to find that through quantitative analysis that the
existence of written alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job
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retention/recovery) is influenced by certain factors. More specifically, it is proposed that
researchers will find that those flight operations that are larger in size, as defined by the
number of pilots, will have written policies in place. Additionally, researchers speculate
that leaders who report these policies as being of higher importance will be more likely to
have these respective written policies in place. It is also proposed that those leaders who
report having suspected and/or addressed an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in their flight
operation will be more likely to have written policies in place. Furthermore, it is
hypothesized that leaders who are more familiar with the HIMS program and report a
being receptive to implementing a policy for the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery
of pilots are more likely to have these policies in place.
This research study expects to find common themes in the sample through
qualitative analysis. In general researchers speculate that the leaders’ discussions of their
attitudes toward alcohol/drug policies are grounded in Zero Tolerance and the Moral
Model of Addiction.
In reviewing alcohol/drug policies to be submitted, most prevalently researchers
expect to see general alcohol/drug policies in the flight operation that are based upon a
reiteration and expansion of FAA regulatory guidelines. It is anticipated that some
policies will contain guidance on the use of substances and outline the consequences of
use outside of these guidelines. Additionally, the Principal Investigator expects to see
drug testing policies referenced, specifically in conjunction with an aircraft incidents or
accidents. Overall, the study expects to find more comprehensive and robust policies to
be found in larger flight operations.
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Significance of Study
Evidence suggests that the prevalence of substance abuse among the professional
pilot population as a whole is no greater than the general population (Snyder, 2003).
However the potentially great costs (financial and human) of incidents and accidents,
would suggest that it is imperative to evaluate and understand the scope of substance
abuse within the professional pilot community flying in corporate/executive flight
operations. Furthermore, the great costs suggest that it is important to create, maintain
and improve effective policies which are designed to protect both employees and
passengers alike. Without such policies that allow for self-disclosure to obtain help and
retain/recover jobs, substance abuse and dependence are forced underground and in many
cases go undetected thereby increasing risk and the potential for safety breeches.
To the researcher’s knowledge no study addressing these issues has ever been
conducted of the professional pilot community within FAR Part 91 corporate/executive
operations. While we can generalize findings from other segments of aviation within the
professional pilot community as a whole, such as commercial and military operations, it
is important to recognize that the operating environment is different from other segments.
Identifying this fact, it is possible that findings of this study may vary from the general
population and of the professional pilot community at large.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The literature review will include four areas: (a) definitions of alcohol and drug
abuse and dependence, the prevalence of this fact in the general population and aviation
community and related aviation accident rates, (b) studies of the relationship of
alcohol/drug related driving violations and aircraft accidents, (c) studies of related
aviation alcohol/drug policies, (d) a review of the Human Intervention Motivation Study
(HIMS) which addresses the issue of alcohol/drug policy and program for pilot
rehabilitation and job recovery. Finally, conclusions are drawn about what is known and
unknown regarding general alcohol and drug policies, rehabilitation policies and job
retention/recovery policies within the corporate/executive aviation community.
Pilots - Alcohol/Drug Abuse and Dependence
Pilots who abuse or are dependent upon alcohol or other chemical substances face
severe consequences including loss of medical certificates, pilot licenses, termination of
employment, legal problems, grave medical conditions and death. Organizations which
have corporate/executive flight operations are also potentially threatened by increased
negative media exposure, loss of revenue, compromised safety, and potential aircraft
incidents and accidents. Additionally, incidents and accidents can result in loss of assets,
loss of life and leadership of professionals and high net worth executives and open the
door to civil and criminal litigation. The culmination of each of these factors results in
severe potential costs to the individual and organization.
9

The review of literature includes information about substance abuse and
dependence. There is substantial information published about alcohol and drug abuse
and dependence. Furthermore, a literature review was conducted of aviation specific
information regarding substance abuse and dependence and subsequent programs for
addressing these issues for pilots.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) acknowledges the value of
education, intervention, treatment and return to flying duties for pilots afflicted by this
common, progressive, fatal, but treatable disease. The FAA has accepted the definition
of substance abuse/dependence provided by the medical community and published by the
Joint Committee of the National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and the
American Society of Addiction Medicine as being,
Alcoholism is a primary chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and
environmental factors influencing its development and manifestations. The
disease is often progressive and fatal. It is characterized by impaired control over
drinking, preoccupation with the drug alcohol, use of alcohol despite adverse
consequences, and distortions in thinking, mostly denial. Each of these symptoms
may be continuous or periodic (Morse, 1992).
In, The Disease Concept of Alcoholism, Dr. Elvin Jellinek, describes alcoholics as
individuals with tolerance, withdrawal symptoms, and either "loss of control" or
"inability to abstain" from alcohol. He maintained that the alcoholic could not drink in
moderation, and, with continued drinking, the disease was progressive and lifethreatening. Jellinek also recognized that some features of the alcoholic disease where
inability to abstain and loss of control were shaped by cultural factors.
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Since Jellinek’s book was published in 1960, numerous studies by behavioral and
social scientists have supported his assertion that alcoholism is a disease. In fact, previous
to his book’s release, The American Medical Association supported the concept of
alcoholism as a disease in 1957. The American Psychiatric Association, the American
Hospital Association, the American Public Health Association, the National Association
of Social Workers, the World Health Organization and the American College of
Physicians have subsequently classified alcoholism as a disease. In the 1970s,
researchers’ conclusions led to the formulation of determining criteria for an "alcohol
dependence syndrome" (Hobbs, 1998).
Alcoholism is widely recognized as a progressive, fatal disease process beyond
the control of an individual, not a weakness in character. Alcoholism has specific causes,
a predictable course and responds to treatment. Untreated, it causes premature death,
reduced productivity and may compromise aviation safety. With proper treatment, most
alcoholics will have full and sustained remission. The result is improved health, social
relationships, job performance and enhanced aviation safety (Snyder, 2003).
The National Institute for Alcoholism Research has estimated that roughly 7
percent of people in the general population who drink or use drugs may become
chemically dependent. Alcohol abuse and dependence affects approximately 5-8 percent
of all pilots, similar to the proportions in other professional occupations such as law,
medicine and ministry.
The disease does not discriminate among professions, socioeconomic classes,
gender, age, education levels or other factors. Nationwide, approximately 13 percent of
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those diagnosed with alcoholism are employed in professional/technical careers (Snyder,
2003).
The FAA defines a substance as, “alcohol; other sedatives and hypnotics;
anxiolytics; opioids; central nervous system stimulants such as cocaine, amphetamines,
and similarly acting sympathomimetics; hallucinogens; phencyclidines or similarly acting
arycyclohexyamines; cannabis; inhalants; and other psychoactive drugs and chemicals”
(14 CFR 67.107, 207, 307).
The FAA defines Substance Abuse as any event within the preceding two years:
(1) Use of a substance in a situation in which the use has been
physically hazardous, if there has been at any other time and instance of a
substance also in a situation in which that use was physically hazardous;
(2) A verified positive drug test result conducted under an anti-drug
rule or internal program or the U.S. Department of Transportation or any
other Administration within the Department of Transportation;
(3) Misuse of a substance that the Federal Air Surgeon, based on case
history and appropriate, qualified medical judgment relating to the
substance involved, finds –
(i)

Makes the person unable to safely perform the duties or exercise

the privileges of the airman certificate applied for or held; or
(ii) May reasonably be expected, for the maximum duration of the
airman medical certificate applied for or held, to make the person unable
to perform those duties or exercise those privileges” (14 CFR 67.107, 207
and 307).
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The FAA defines Substance Dependence as a condition in which a person
is dependent on a substance, other than tobacco or ordinary xanthinecontaining beverages (e.g., caffeine) beverages as evidenced by:
(A) Increased Tolerance;
(B) Manifestation of withdrawal symptoms;
(C) Impaired control of use; or
(D) Continued use despite damage to physical health or impairment of social,
personal, or occupational functioning” (14 CFR 67.107, 207 and 307).
The above definition is rather broad. Many circumstances that people may not
associate with substance dependence would meet the FAA definition. Examples include:
a. Walking and driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.20 mg/dl (Increased
tolerance);
b. Delirium Tremens (DTs’), fast heart rates and irritability (Manifestations of
withdrawal symptoms);
c. Drinking more than 5 drinks at a time (binging) or having an “eye opener”
(Impaired control)
d. Drinking despite liver test abnormalities, domestic abuse complaints associated
with alcohol, divorce or use of sick leave due to hangovers or blackouts (Snyder,
2003).
The FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI) reports in its publication Alcohol
and Flying, approximately 12 percent of all pilots in fatal general aviation accidents over
a seven year period had measurable levels of alcohol in their bloodstream at the time of
their death.
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General aviation has not compiled such an incident/accident-free record (as the
airlines). Although the rate of alcohol-related accidents is very low, their results
are almost always lethal. From 1996-2001 the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) reported that 33 aircraft accidents were determined to be alcoholrelated. Approximate 70 percent of those accidents involved fatalities where in
total thirty-six people died. Only two cases reported any occupant escaping
unharmed (Ibold, 2002).
Aviation, Space and Environmental Medicine reported that approximately 7
percent of U.S. adults are alcoholics. From this statistic, in 1983 Cromwell
concluded that, "Perhaps as many as 10 percent were either alcoholics or victims
of problem drinking. The U.S. has about 750,000 licensed airmen. Over 60,000 of
these are airline transport pilots, 200,000 are commercial pilots, and the
remainders are private pilots. Statistically, this would produce a potential of
75,000 problem drinkers in U.S. airmen," (Cromwell, 1983).
According to the Civil Aeromedical Institute (CAMI), a division of the FAA,
identifying pilots who have suffered the latent effects of alcohol and drugs but no trace
amounts are found in the bloodstream are much more difficult to identify. Even after
complete elimination of all of the alcohol in the body, there are undesirable effectshangover-that can last 48 to 72 hours following the last drink. The hangover effect as
produced by alcoholic beverages after the acute intoxication has worn off, and Blood
Alcohol Content (BAC) has been restored to 0.00 may potentially be just as dangerous as
the intoxication itself. A pilot with hangover effect symptoms such as headache,
dizziness, dry mouth, stuffy nose, fatigue, upset stomach, irritability, impaired judgment,

14

and increased sensitivity to bright light would not be fit to fly. The hangover effect in a
pilot would qualify as being "under the influence of alcohol" (FAA Civil Aeromedical
Institute, n.d.).
The rate of alcohol elimination is essentially constant for an average, healthy
person despite the total amount of alcohol consumed. The rate of elimination of pure
alcohol is fairly constant, approximately 1/3 to 1/2 oz. of pure alcohol per hour. In
layman’s terms, the rate of elimination is the same whether a person consumes low to
high amounts of alcohol. Thus, the more alcoholic beverages a person takes in, the
increased amount of time it takes that person to eliminate it from his/her system. The
brain, eyes, and inner ear are significantly affected by the alcohol in the body. Each of
these body systems is critical to a pilot. Impaired reaction time, reasoning, judgment, and
memory are some of the results of alcohol on the brain. The brain is limited in its ability
to efficiently use oxygen as a result of alcohol in the body. In the air potentially hypoxic
situations can be magnified due to simultaneous exposure to altitude, characterized by a
decreased partial pressure of oxygen. Visual symptoms are impaired through eye muscle
imbalance, leading to double vision and focusing difficulties. Vestibular or inner ear
difficulties arise resulting in dizziness and decreased hearing perception. Compound the
situation with normally occurring environmental factors such as sleep deprivation,
fatigue, medication use, altitude hypoxia, or flying at night or in bad weather, the
negative effects can be exponential (FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute, n.d.).
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Study of Driving Convictions and Aircraft Accidents/Incidents
In a study conducted by Kathleen McFadden, a researcher at Northern Illinois
University, she studied the driving and flying records of over 70,000 airline pilots over a
seven-year period, 1986-1992. The results of her study which cross referenced the
National Driver Register with the NTSB’s aircraft incident/accident database were
sobering.
Traffic tickets can be a frequent warning sign of substance abuse. Speeding and
other moving violations may be associated with substance use even legally unintoxicated.
McFadden attempted to identify a correlation between pilots who are caught driving
under the influence and one’s who have had an aircraft incident or accident.
Her results showed that those pilots who had received a Driving While
Intoxicated (DWI) or Driving Under the Influence (DUI) violation were more likely to
have had an aircraft incident or accident. The findings showed that out of 70,164 pilots
there were 68,792 that had no DWI/DUI convictions. However, 1,281 pilots had one
DWI/DUI conviction and 91 had 2 or more DWI/DUI convictions. In total from 19861992 there were 259 aircraft incident/accidents which represents 0.37 percent of the total
airline pilot population and 246 aircraft incident/accidents for those pilots who did not
have any DWI/DUI violations. Unfortunately though, for those pilots who did receive a
DWI/DUI violation the results showed that there were 11 aircraft accidents (0.86 percent)
for those who had one violation and 2 aircraft accidents (2.20 percent) for those pilots
who had two or more DWI/DUI convictions. These results show a history one DWI/DUI
conviction was associated with double the risk of a pilot-error accident. Two or more
convictions more than quadrupled the risk -- this despite the fact that no pilot tested
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positive for alcohol during any post-accident investigation during the study period. The
good news is that 98 percent of the airline pilot population had no convictions of a
DWI/DUI.
However, of particular interest is in the 13 cases in which a pilot had both a
DWI/DUI conviction and a pilot-error accident, the DWI/DUI preceded the airplane
crash 10 times. Recognizably, these numbers are small and some may view them as
insignificant. The researcher however used a generous statistical threshold for
significance because of the public-safety aspect involved.
Although the FAA now systematically queries the National Driver Register each
time an airman applies for a medical certificate. The results of this study raise an
important question as to whether a DWI/DUI conviction should be causation to
administer a substance abuse/dependence assessment. Additionally, because of the
variance time to exercise the privileges of Class 1, 2 and 3 medical certificates, airmen
are screened inconsistently.
McFadden’s study also showed there was no evidence to support the concept that
random alcohol testing is a preventative measure. Random testing may have acted as
some form of deterrent for other pilots (McFadden, 1998).
In 2002, a follow-up study was conducted by Professor McFadden to assess the
success of the FAA’s program that was instituted to deal with pilots convicted of
DWI/DUI’s. Prior to 1990, the FAA did not take any action against pilots with
DWI/DUI convictions unless they did not disclose them on their application for a medical
certificate. The new FAA program cross-references the National Driver Register with
those pilots applying for a new medical certificate. If a pilot receives two or more
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DWI/DUI convictions within a three year period, s/he can have his/her pilot’s license
revoked.
The follow-up research studied a five-year period prior to the new rules (19861990) and five years after the new rules took effect (1993-1997). The results showed that
from 1986-1990; 1,478 pilots (0.97 percent) were convicted of a DWI/DUI. From 19931997; 2,593 pilots (1.62 percent) were convicted of a DWI/DUI. Disturbingly,
McFadden found 29 airline pilots with four DWI/DUI convictions, six with five
convictions and three with six. During the period in which the new FAA screening was
instituted, as the convictions of DWI/DUI’s rose in airline pilots, nationwide in the
general population during that same period DWI/DUI convictions dropped by 20 percent.
She noted that her finding showed 463 pilots that had multiple convictions during the 10
year study period, most of which evaded FAA penalties. The percentage of pilots with
more than one DWI/DUI also increased, going from 0.08 percent to 0.13 percent.
The researcher concluded the FAA's reporting requirements and sanctions against
pilots with DWI/DUI convictions was ineffective as a deterrent and that it has not
reduced the probability of pilots receiving an initial DWI/DUI violation or subsequent
convictions. Unfortunately, the proportion of the pilots receiving DWI/DUI convictions
has actually increased during the five-year period studies in which the FAA’s new
screening program was in place.
McFadden cites that the FAA’s program would be more effective if action were
taken the first time a pilot received a DUI. Again this evidence supports the concept that
pilot’s should be evaluated for a substance abuse/dependence problem upon receiving a
DWI/DUI conviction. This process may save lives and careers (King, 2002).
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Study of Airline Alcohol/Drug Policies
In a 1994-1995 study of air carrier alcohol and drug policies conducted by
Christopher Cook of the Kent Institute of Medicine and Health Science Department at the
University of Kent in Canterbury, UK 194 airlines were invited to participate. Ninetytwo carriers responded to the survey (24 UK and 68 other countries) equating to an
overall response rate of 47 percent. Surveys were addressed to the Senior Occupational
Physician however many respondents were from Chief Pilots and company executives.
Six yes/no format questions were presented as to whether the airline had a company
policy regarding:
1) Alcohol consumption by aircrew prior to flight.
2) Illicit drug use by aircrew.
3) Use of prescribed and ‘over the counter’ medication by aircrew.
4) Screening of aircrew for alcohol/drug misuse.
5) Prevention of alcohol/drug misuse among aircrew.
6) Management of alcohol misuse in aircrew.
The results of question one showed that 76 (82.6 percent) have a company policy on
alcohol, 12 (13.0 percent) have no company policy but revert to their respective
aviation authority policy, and finally 4 (4.4 percent) have no policy. Question 2
showed the following results: 62 (67.4 percent) have a company policy, 10 (10.9
percent) rely on the aviation authority’s policy and 20 (21.7 percent) have no policy.
In question three airlines responded that 70 (76.1 percent) have a company policy, 7
(7.6 percent) hold the aviation authority’s policy, and 15 (16.3 percent) have no
policy. Question 4’s screening policy revealed that 18 (19.3 percent) had a company
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policy, 6 (6.6 percent) held the aviation authority’s policy, and 67 (72.8 percent) had
no screening policy. Prevention policies in place at these airlines showed that 27
(30.0 percent) had a company policy, 4 (4.3) relied on the aviation authority policy,
and 59 (64.1 percent) had no policy for screening. Finally, airlines showed that in the
management of alcohol misuse by aircrew 26 (29.5 percent) had a policy, 7 (8.0
percent) reverted to the aviation authority, and 55 (59.8 percent) had no policy. To
summarize the majority of responding airlines surveyed have company policies
covering the use of alcohol, illicit and prescribed/over the counter drugs by aircrew.
However, only a minority of airlines have a company policy that address screening,
prevention, and management of alcohol and drug issues.
In this study, the author concludes that in many cases the question regarding
prevention policies were likely unclear and misunderstood. Mr. Cook even speculates
that the respondents failed to understand the distinction between policies of prevention of
drug and alcohol abuse/dependence and reactive policies.
This survey included a request to responding airlines to provide a copy of written
alcohol/drug policies. This allowed the researchers to further qualitatively analyze the
dichotomous variables in the questions provided.
The results of this study show that almost all airlines have some type of
alcohol/drug policy for pilots. The author concludes that this reflects a perception that
these policies are necessary and important relevant to the serious safety risk involved.
Alternatively, few airlines have taken more than general measures to screen, prevent and
manage alcohol/drug problems in pilots. As the author acknowledges, this survey failed
to appropriately define or clarify the difference to the survey respondents. This
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information is subsequently supported by the qualitative information submitted in the few
written policies submitted.
Mr. Cook speculates how the policies described in the study might be applied in
other areas of aviation that have a higher documented incidence of alcohol/drug related
incidents and accidents. This study forms a basis for further investigation of alcohol/drug
policies in other parts of aviation given improvement in clarification of the survey
questions (Cook, 1997).
Pilots in Recovery
“The FAA supports programs that lead the alcoholic aviator to recovery. This
recovery program encourages the airman to self-identify, promotes rehabilitation, and
ultimately, advances aviation safety” (Borrillo, 2003).
In the 1970s, the Human Intervention Motivation Study (HIMS) grew out of a
grant from the National Institute for Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism. This program
which is a cooperative, mutually supportive program between the FAA, Pilot Union and
airline allows pilots to seek treatment and rehabilitation that leads to medical
certification. An analysis of the program found that with proper treatment the airline
pilot rehabilitation rate was successful (92-95%) and cost effective, a Return On
Investment (ROI) of $9 for every $1 spent (Borrillo, 2003). Per the HIMS website,
www.himsprogram.com over 3500 pilots that have participated in the program are flying
today after loss of their medical certificate (Martinez, 2003).
In 2002, 879 1st class, 218 2nd class, and 318 3rd class special issuance medical
certificates were issued to substance-dependent pilots, of which 1,415 were for
alcoholism, and 79 for illicit drug dependence. Over a three year period, pilots

21

participating in the HIMS program showed a 10 percent relapse rate according to the
Aviation Medicine Advisory Service (Borillo, 2003).
According to Dr. Quay Snyder of Virtual Flight Surgeons there are three choices
for companies in addressing recognition, treatment and assistance for alcohol and drug
abuse/dependence of its pilots. First, a company can choose to do nothing, essentially
ignoring the fact that there may potentially be an issue that arises. In these cases, pilots
are at the mercy of corporate policy and FAA regulations. Secondly, an organization
may adopt a policy of Zero Tolerance which subjects pilots to termination who are
discovered even if they seek help. This approach further serves to fuel the disease being
hidden, going undiscovered and unreported. Finally, the final strategy is one of a
proactive approach. This approach involves compassionate concern and constructive
confrontation. The proactive approach does not tolerate behaviors contrary to company
or regulatory policies, such as consistently showing up for flights late or under the
influence of substances. However, behavioral aspects are treated as separate issues from
recognition, treatment and assistance of the disease.
Critical factors in the success of a proactive approach are:
1) Commitment of confidentiality to the employee seeking assistance
2) Non-punitive approach for the employee seeking help
3) Clearly defined, well publicized procedures for seeking help and obtaining
treatment that include the consequences of choices given to the employee
4) Adequate medical coverage/insurance
5) Sick leave policy that allows use of this time for treatment
6) Short-term/Long-term disability policy for use during recovery period
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7) Cooperation and coordination of insurance/Employee Assistance Program
(EAP)
8) Treatment at a credible facility that use professionals in all phases of
treatment and extended aftercare programs – all which must be acceptable
to the FAA
9) Peer/Fellow pilot monitor active in all aspects of the recovery program
(required by the FAA) (Snyder, 2003).
One such proactive approach program is the Human Intervention Motivation
Study (HIMS) jointly administered by the FAA, the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) or
the Allied Pilots Association (APA), and respective airline management. The HIMS
program allows an avenue for pilots seeking treatment and rehabilitation that leads to
early FAA medical certification under special issuance. The HIMS program includes the
following elements:
Written Structure
1) A written policy including a mission statement that defines the goals of the
program
2) Written company policies clearly stated
3) Clear written guidance describing procedures for each participant in the program
to follow
Treatment Continuum
1) Identification of a potential problem
2) Intervention for a specific individual
3) Assessment of whether a problem truly exists by impartial, trained professionals
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4) Treatment, including aftercare
5) Continuous monitoring
Medical Certification
1) Careful review of all aspects of treatment continuum
2) Review of monitoring program by company, peers, and medical professionals
3) Certification is not permanent, but is subject to periodic review and
documentation of continued sobriety and commitment to a 12-step program.
Education
1) Training for specific groups involved in the program such as – EAP staff,
supervisory/management staff, Directors of Aviation/Operations, Chief Pilots,
professional standards personnel, peer monitors, entire pilot group and their
families.
2) Promotion of the program to reinforce procedures for seeking help.
Evaluation
Finally, regular evaluation of the proactive approach program is necessary for consistent
improvement (Snyder, 2003).
Conclusions
The HIMS program is currently being modified for individual corporate aviation
organizations by Virtual Flight Surgeons (VFS). Virtual Flight Surgeons is a private
practice team of Aviation Medical Examiners (AME’s) providing FAA medical
certification expertise. Anecdotally, these programs and other policy formation are being
created as result of specific alcohol/drug related incidents that have occurred with crew
members. Presently, the current status of alcohol and drug policies is unknown in FAR
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Part 91 corporate/executive flight departments. Subsequently, there is not an accurate
gauge of the potential impact of a HIMS type program for corporate aviation
organizations, both in terms of whole numbers of policies but in terms of numbers of
pilots assisted.
Further analysis of the status quo is required by studying the types of alcohol/drug
policies are currently in place within Part 91 corporate/executive flight operations.
Additionally, data are required to understand the prevalence of alcohol and drug related
suspicion and incidents that flight department leaders may be facing. Finally, it is vital to
the success of a HIMS-type program to assess the corporate aviation leader’s familiarity
with the program and receptiveness towards the implementation of such policies. This
study proposes a plan to address these questions.
In the future, the implementation of a HIMS-type program in corporate aviation
operations should be monitored for the degree of qualitative and quantitative success, and
the magnitude of its impact on pilots, their organizations and families.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS AND PROCEDURES
Study Design
In order to specifically address the research questions posed in this research
proposal, the study consisted of a combination of quantitative and qualitative research in
a casual-comparative, quasi-experimental design using quasi-replication methodology.
This study used Cook’s 1994-1995 study that surveyed air crew alcohol and drug policies
among international, commercial airlines as a guiding material to create this study. In
personal communications with Mr. Cook in May of 2007, the original survey instrument
used in his study was no long available and determined to be unrecoverable. Therefore,
this study developed survey questions based loosely upon Mr. Cook’s final data,
conclusions, and recommendations.
Quantitative information was gathered through a series of finite questions.
Qualitative information was collected through a series of open-ended questions designed
to gather a deeper understanding of answers submitted in the quantitative portion.
Additionally, subjects were asked to submit copies copy of written company alcohol and
drug policies for further qualitative analysis. In using an instrument that synthesized
quantitative and qualitative data it was hoped that the richest information could be
obtained about the industry’s status quo of written company alcohol/drug policies. This
study sought to gain an understanding of the prevalence of suspicion and the rate of
addressing substance abuse/dependence issues in flight operations. Additionally, this
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study wished to gain insight about leader’s familiarity with the FAA’s program to return
pilots to duty after a substance issue and the level of receptiveness to the addition of
policies for the rehabilitation and job recovery of pilots. Finally, through analysis it is
hoped that conclusions can be drawn about the relationship of those corporate/executive
flight operations which have alcohol/drug policies and those that do not.
Instrument
The survey instrument included the collection of demographic information, six
groupings of questions and one request for submission. The demographic data collected
were: Number of Pilots, Number of Aircraft, and Types of Aircraft (noting multiples of
same aircraft type). The first three groupings of questions attempted to identify the
prevalence of three types of written (general, rehabilitation, job retention/recovery)
alcohol/drug policies within FAR Part 91 corporate/executive operations. These three
groupings of questions each included: a) Dichotomous, Yes/No question regarding the
status quo of written drug/alcohol policies, b) Likert-scale type question asking the
decision maker to rank between 1-5 how important having the policies were, and c) Free
form area asking the participant to discuss why these policies were or were not important.
The fourth and fifth grouping of questions sought to identify the if participants had ever
suspected substance issues with air crew members and whether or not they had ever had
to address substance issues with pilots. These questions asked the participant to answer
one dichotomous, Yes/No question for each. The sixth grouping of questions sought to
identify the familiarity with the HIMS program and the receptiveness of implementing an
alcohol/drug policy that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery into the
participants’ flight operation. The participant was asked the following: a) Likert-scale
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type question asking the leader to rank between 1-5 the level of familiarity with the
HIMS program, b) One Ranking, Yes/Maybe/No question to identify whether or not the
participants’ company/department would consider implementation of pilot rehabilitation
and job retention/recovery policy, c) Free form area asking the participant to discuss why
they would or would not consider such a policy. Finally, the last question of the survey
asked the participant if they are willing to be contacted by the Principle Investigator who
would arrange to obtain copies of written alcohol/drug policies for further qualitative
analysis. This section additionally notes protection of any information submitted and that
it is treated a confidential. See Appendix A for a sample of the survey created.
Instrument Reliability and Validity
In order to insure validity of the survey instrument, a panel of five industry and
educational experts were selected to review the content of the questionnaire. The team of
educational and industry experts were drawn from the John D. Odegard School for
Aerospace Sciences at the University of North Dakota and Virtual Flight Surgeons. The
experts that provided several rigorous reviews of and final approval for the content
validity of the instrument were: Warren Jensen, M.D.; Paul Lindseth, PhD; Thomas
Petros, PhD; Doug Marshall, J.D.; and Quay Snyder, M.D.
Sample
For the purposes of this study, the population was limited to those FAR Part 91
Corporate/Executive Operators represented as members of the National Business
Aviation Association (NBAA). NBAA is the primary organization representing business
aviation operators that include corporate/executive flight operations in addition to other
entities such as FAR Part 135 Charter Operators and FAR Part 91 Subpart K Fractional
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Operations. The NBAA has the most comprehensive and mission-categorized
membership of corporate/executive operations of any representative organization.
According to NBAA, the organization represents approximately 60 percent of all
corporate/executive flight departments operating today (NBAA, 2005).
The disparity of represented operators and aircraft is due to many corporate/executive
flight departments operating single aircraft and opting not to join the NBAA membership.
Although representative membership fluctuates, in whole numbers NBAA estimates that
the organization represents approximately 4,600 FAR Part 91 corporate/executive
operators (NBAA, 2005).
The NBAA 2006 Membership Directory was used to select convenience sample
of participant invitees based upon published email addresses of corporate flight
department leaders. A total of 1,641 email addresses were compiled by hand from a
hardcopy version of the membership directory to create the convenience sample.
Due to statistical power concerns researchers would have liked to have achieved a
large response rate. However, researchers are confident that the response rate achieved
fell within the appropriate range. Using logistic regression an appropriate sample size
also fell within the acceptable range.
Protection of Human Subjects
The research proposal was reviewed by the human subjects committee of the
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of North Dakota. The IRB granted
Exempt/Expedited Review of the project on September 14, 2007. The research project
proposal to the IRB included a copy of informed consent for participants. The first page
of the survey instrument contained the informed consent page. Potential participants
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were informed of the size, scope, length, cost and benefits of the survey and were given
the option of discontinuing the survey at any time. Respondents were informed of the
risk of their involvement and how to where help could be sought if they experienced
difficulty with the subject matter. Participants were also given information about privacy
of the information submitted and how data would be coded. Finally, contact information
for the Principal Investigator, graduate committee and IRB were given. In order to
precede to the survey questions, participants were required to select the option I Accept.
Alternatively, prospective participants were given the option of selecting the option I
Decline.
Raw data is to be stored for a minimum of three years after data analysis is
complete. This meets the sufficient time frame required by federal, state, and local
regulations, sponsor requirements, and organizational policies and procedures.
The Principal Investigator established an account with Survey Monkey for the duration of
the study which guaranteed privacy and security through an encryption process. The
Survey Monkey account could only be accessed by private account name and password.
The raw data was downloaded to the Principal Investigator’s private computer and will
be retained securely by the PI for the required time period.
Data Collection
The survey invitation was emailed to the selected sample of 1,641 flight
department leaders via SurveyMonkey.com. The invitation provided a direct web link to
the secure third-party vendor website, Survey Monkey which specializes in online survey
administration. Using an online survey company provided numerous advantages such as
the speed and ease of distribution of the survey, constant monitoring of response rates,
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automation of reminder messages and the ability to securely store raw data.
The email invitation gave a brief explanation of the purpose of the survey and
contact information for the Principle Investigator. Participants were asked in the
invitation to complete the survey within 15 days. Follow up reminder emails requesting
participation occurred seven days and two days prior to the deadline date. See Appendix
B for a sample of the email invitation.
The survey was launched on October 15, 2007. Data collection lasted for
through the 31st of October 2007. In the initial mailing, some email invitations were
undeliverable; 293 email addresses were determined to be invalid or were filtered through
a spam blocker to decline the message. A reminder message was sent to those who had
not yet responded to the survey on October 24th. The reminder email was distributed to
1,213 people of those 33 messages were undeliverable or were declined. Finally, on
October 31st a final reminder message was sent to 1,101 people, no messages were
undeliverable. By capturing the amount of returned email invitations and tracking when
invitations were responded to, it was calculated that 1, 298 people received the
invitation(s) in their email inbox. Thus the sample population for this survey was 1,298
people. From the invitation, invitees were given the choice of opting out of the survey;
31 people exercised this option. Two-hundred and fifty-five (255) flight department
leaders responded to the survey by following the web link to begin the survey. Two of
these people contacted the Principle Investigator to indicate that due to security features
enabled on their computers they could not follow the web link provided in the email
invitation. An alternate link option was provided that allowed them to cut and paste the
link into their web browser provided to these people to complete the survey. Of the 255
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people who began the survey, 6 people declined the informed consent, leaving 249
potential participants.
The scope of this survey was limited to FAR Part 91 Corporate Flight Operations.
Measures were taken to limit the email invitation to those operating exclusively under
FAR Part 91 prior to the mailing. However, to ensure that respondents did in fact operate
under Part 91 rules only, the first question of the survey asked participants to indicated
what FAR regulatory Part(s) the operated under. Of the 249 people responding to this
question, 221 participants were determined to qualify to continue the survey. The
participants that did not qualify either operated under multiple regulatory rules, an
alternate regulatory Part or did not answer, thus eliminating these people from continuing
the survey.
Data Analysis
Following the closure of the survey, raw data was exported from the online survey
administrator, Survey Monkey. The download function from Survey Monkey allowed
for quantitative data to be coded in numerical form for those questions that were
categorical. Both quantitative and qualitative raw data was exported and downloaded
into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The Principal Investigator was then easily able to
manipulate the data by sorting to extract quantitative from the qualitative data, while still
maintaining the integrity of the entire raw data set. Quantitative data was then cut and
pasted into the data view of the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). In
SPSS, the raw data for Likert scales and categorical were then coded in the variable view.
In an effort to gather the richest information possible about the subject area a
synthesis of descriptive and inferential quantitative statistics were used. Additionally,
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qualitative data was analyzed in order to identify common themes.
The independent variables chosen included: 1) demographic information
collected: number of pilots, number of aircraft and type(s) of aircraft, 2) reported
importance rating of these written alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) 3) participants’ reported suspicion of alcohol/drug issues in air crew
members and reported events of actually addressing alcohol/drug issues, 4) familiarity
with the FAA’s HIMS program, and 5) and receptiveness of instituting drug/alcohol
rehabilitation and job recovery policies for pilots. Dependent variables included the
existence of written alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery).
Quantitative data gathered were first analyzed using descriptive statistics. Raw
numerical data and percentages were calculated for categorical data. Frequency
distributions, means, modes, medians, standard deviations, variances, skewness, standard
errors of skewness, ranges, minimums, maximums and sums were also calculated and
analyzed for continuous data. Inferential statistics were used to calculate correlations and
regression using non-parametric statistical tests. Statistical tests of the data were
administered through SPSS.
Correlations were calculated to identify relationships between the existence of
alcohol/drug policies (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) and
demographic information of flight department size, importance rating of the respective
policies (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery), suspicion of and actual
addressing of alcohol/drug issues with pilots, familiarity with the HIMS program and
receptiveness to instituting a policy inclusive of rehabilitation and job retention/recovery.
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The Point Biserial coefficient (rpb) statistic was used to calculate the correlation
between the dependent variables of policy existence (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) and the independent variables: number of pilots, importance rating of
the respective policy, familiarity level with the HIMS program and receptiveness. This
statistical test was chosen due to the dichotomous, categorical nature of the dependent
variable of either having a policy or not.
The Phi coefficient (Φ) statistic was used to calculate the correlation between the
dependent variables of policy existence (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) and the independent variables: existence of suspicion and actual
addressing of alcohol/drug issues with pilots. This statistic was chosen due to the
dichotomous, categorical nature of both the dependent and independent variables.
Logistic regression statistical analyses were performed for each data set to assess
the relationship between the predictors (size, importance levels, suspicion and/or
addressing of an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program
and receptiveness to implementing a policy that includes rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) and the outcomes of having a (general alcohol/drug, rehabilitation
and job retention/recovery) policy or not. This regression test was chosen due to the
dichotomous, categorical nature of the dependent variables of policy (general
alcohol/drug, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) existence.
Qualitative data gathered through free form questions supporting quantitative data
were evaluated for common themes, unique perspectives and divergent content. This
data was then evaluated within the context of quantitative answers given by respondents,
thereby giving a robust depth to answers given in the survey. Qualitative data gathered
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from submissions of written alcohol/drug policies currently in place in flight operations
were evaluated for common themes, unique content, and reported accordingly.
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CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
Quantitative Analysis
Descriptive Statistics
This research study was designed to gain insight about the status quo of
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policies for FAR Part 91
corporate/executive flight operations. Overall, researchers sought to determine the
distribution of the answers to each of the questions posed in the study using descriptive
statistics.
The initial phase of the survey involved the collection of demographic
information. Survey participants were asked how many pilots were employed by their
flight department, 216 people answered this question, and 5 people omitted the question.
The total number of pilots employed by these companies was 1,219 with an average
flight department size of 5.64 (or 6) pilots per flight department. Participants were then
asked the total number of aircraft operated by their flight departments. 214 people
answered this question, 7 people omitted the question. The total number of aircraft
operated by these companies was 473 with an average of 2.21 (or 2) aircraft per flight
operation. In a freeform answer, participants were then asked to identify which types of
aircraft that their flight department operated. 209 people answered the question with 12
people opting to not list the specific aircraft equipment. In reviewing the data
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collected, there were seven respondents that began the survey answering the first two
demographic questions, but no more. These responses were removed from the dataset.
In the General Alcohol/Drug Policy section, participants were asked if their flight
operation had a written alcohol/drug policy in place for pilots. Two-hundred and nine
(209) people answered this question and 12 omitted the question. Of the respondents, 142
(67.9%) indicated that they did have a written policy in place and 67 (32.1%) indicated
that they did not have a written policy in place in their flight operation. See Table 1 for
the frequency distribution of written alcohol/drug policies. When further asking the
participants opinion of how important it was for Business Aviation flight operations to
have written alcohol/drug policies in place for pilots, 209 people answered this question
with 12 skipping the question. The distribution of results from those answering showed 7
(3.3%) indicated it was not important, 16 (7.7%) said it was of minor importance, 35
(16.7%) noted they were neutral on the subject, 53 (25.4%) said it was important and 98
(46.9%) said it was very important to have written policies. See Table 2 for the
frequency distribution of the importance rating for general alcohol/drug policies. From
this question, participants were asked to indicate why a written policy was important or
not; 150 participants wrote freeform answers to this question, 59 people declined the
freeform answer.
Table 1

Frequency Distribution of Written General Alcohol/Drug Policies
D/A Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

No
Yes
Total
999 (Missing)

Frequency
67
142
209
3
212

Percent
31.6
67.0
98.6
1.4
100.0
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Valid Percent
32.1
67.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
32.1
100.0

Table 2

Frequency Distribution of Importance Levels of General Alcohol/Drug
Policies
Importance of D/A Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Important
Minorly Important
Neutral
Important
Very Important
Total
999

Frequency
7
16
35
53
98
209
3
212

Percent
3.3
7.5
16.5
25.0
46.2
98.6
1.4
100.0

Valid Percent
3.3
7.7
16.7
25.4
46.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
3.3
11.0
27.8
53.1
100.0

In the rehabilitation section of the survey, participants were asked if their flight
operation had a written alcohol/drug policy that specifically addressed the rehabilitation
of pilots who have alcohol or drug issues. Two-hundred and six (206) people answered
this question with 12 skipping the question. Participants indicated that 41 (19.9%) do
have a written policy regarding rehabilitation and 165 (80.1%) do not. See Table 3 for
the frequency distribution of written rehabilitation policies. When asked how important
it is for Business Aviation flight operations to have written alcohol/drug policies that
specifically address the rehabilitation of pilot who have alcohol or drug issues, 206
participants rated their opinion, while 15 people omitted the question. Participant ratings
ranged from 26 (12.6%) indicating it was Not Important, to 24 (11.7%) indicating this
being Minorly Important, to 81 (39.3%) noting a Neutral position, to 42 (20.4%) saying it
was Important and 33 (16.0%) rating this as Very Important. See Table 4 for the
frequency distribution of the importance rating for rehabilitation policies. From this
question, participants were asked to indicate why a written rehabilitation policy was
important or not; 126 participants wrote freeform answers to this question, 80 declined
the freeform answer.
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Table 3

Frequency Distribution of Written Rehabilitation Policies
Rehab Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

Table 4

No
Yes
Total
999

Frequency
165
41
206
6
212

Percent
77.8
19.3
97.2
2.8
100.0

Valid Percent
80.1
19.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
80.1
100.0

Frequency Distribution of Importance Levels of Rehabilitation Policies
Importance of Rehab Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Important
Minorly Important
Neutral
Important
Very Important
Total
999

Frequency
26
24
81
42
33
206
6
212

Percent
12.3
11.3
38.2
19.8
15.6
97.2
2.8
100.0

Valid Percent
12.6
11.7
39.3
20.4
16.0
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
12.6
24.3
63.6
84.0
100.0

In the job retention/recovery section, participants were first asked if their flight
department had a written policy that specifically addressed the job retention/recovery of
pilots who have alcohol or drug issues. Two-hundred and two (202) participants
answered the question and 19 omitted the question. Of those who answered, 32 (15.8%)
people said that their flight operation had a written policy addressing job recovery or
retention and 170 (84.2%) indicated that they did not such a written policy. See Table 5
for the frequency distribution of written job retention/recovery policies. Participants
were then asked to rate (in their opinion) the importance of having written policies on job
recovery/retention for pilots who have had alcohol or drug issues. Two-hundred and two
(202) participants rated the importance levels and 19 people omitted the question. Rating
ranged from 27 (13.4%) noting that this was Not Important, 20 (9.9%) said this was
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Minorly Important, 85 (42.1%) rating themselves as having a Neutral position, 42
(20.8%) said the issue was Important and 28 (13.9%) showed this area as being Very
Important. See Table 6 for the frequency distribution of the importance rating for general
alcohol/drug policies. From this question, participants were then asked to indicate why
or why not in a freeform answer, of which 102 people made written commentary about
their rating.
Table 5

Frequency Distribution of Written Job Retention/Recovery Policies
Job Retention/Recovery Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

Table 6

No
Yes
Total
999

Frequency
172
30
202
10
212

Percent
81.1
14.2
95.3
4.7
100.0

Valid Percent
85.1
14.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
85.1
100.0

Frequency Distribution of Importance Levels of Job Retention/Recovery
Policies
Importance of Job Retention/Recovery Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

Not Important
Minorly Important
Neutral
Important
Very Important
Total
999

Frequency
27
20
85
42
28
202
10
212

Percent
12.7
9.4
40.1
19.8
13.2
95.3
4.7
100.0

Valid Percent
13.4
9.9
42.1
20.8
13.9
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
13.4
23.3
65.3
86.1
100.0

In the Alcohol/Drug Issues section participants were asked first if they had ever
been suspicious that a pilot in their flight operation might have some kind of alcohol or
drug issue. Two-hundred and three (203) people answered the question of which 50
(24.6%) indicated Yes they did have suspicions and 153 (75.4%) said No they had never
40

suspected any pilot of having an alcohol or drug issue. Eighteen (18) people omitted the
question. See Table 7 for the frequency distribution of suspecting an alcohol/drug issue
with pilots. In the second portion of this section, participants were asked if they had ever
had to address an alcohol or drug issue with a pilot in their flight operation. 203 people
answered this question, of which 47 (23.2%) said Yes they have had to address an
alcohol or drug issue with a pilot in their flight operation and 156 (76.8%) said they had
never had to address this issue. Eighteen (18) people omitted the question. See Table 8
for the frequency distribution of actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with pilots.
Table 7

Frequency Distribution of Suspicion of Alcohol/Drug Issues
Suspect D/A Problem

Valid

Missing
Total

Table 8

No
Yes
Total
999

Frequency
153
50
203
9
212

Percent
72.2
23.6
95.8
4.2
100.0

Valid Percent
75.4
24.6
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
75.4
100.0

Frequency Distribution of Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues
Actual Addressing D/A Problem

Valid

Missing
Total

No
Yes
Total
999

Frequency
156
47
203
9
212

Percent
73.6
22.2
95.8
4.2
100.0

Valid Percent
76.8
23.2
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
76.8
100.0

In the Incorporation of Written Alcohol/Drug Policies section, participants where
asked to rate their familiarity with the voluntary FAA program, the Human Intervention
Motivation Study (HIMS) to return pilots diagnosed with alcohol and drug issues to
flying with the cooperation of the employer. Two-hundred and two (202) people rated
41

their familiarity with the HIMS program and 19 omitted the question. The distribution of
familiarity ratings ranged from those who were Unfamiliar (Never heard of the HIMS
program), 132 (65.3%); to those who were Somewhat Familiar (Heard of the HIMS
program, but did not know where to obtain details), 57 (28.3%); to those Familiar (Have
obtained HIMS program details and know where to obtain additional information), 10
(5.0%); to those Very Familiar (Have used the HIMS program as guidance in developing
their own departmental alcohol & drug policy), 2 (1.0%); and those who were Extremely
Familiar (Implemented a HIMS program in their flight department), 1 (0.5%). See Table
9 for the frequency distribution of familiarity level with the HIMS program. In the
second half of this section, participants where asked if their flight department would
consider a written alcohol/drug policy for the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery of
pilots if a proven, successful template was provided. Two-hundred and two (202) people
answered the question of which 51 (25.2%) indicated that Yes they would, 97 (48.0%)
indicated Maybe and 54 (26.7%) said No. Nineteen (19) people omitted the question.
See Table 10 for the frequency distribution of receptiveness to implementation of a
rehabilitation and job retention/recovery policy. Upon completion of this question,
participants were asked to give a freeform notation of why or why not, 92 people
responded.
Descriptive statistics were calculated to further describe continuous data. See
Table 11 for the illustration of the descriptive statistics of the data collected.
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Table 9

Frequency Distribution of Levels of Familiarity with the HIMS Program
How Familiar w/ HIMS

Valid

Missing
Total

Unfamiliar
Somewhat Familiar
Familiar
Very Familiar
Extremely Familiar
Total
999

Frequency
132
57
10
2
1
202
10
212

Percent
62.3
26.9
4.7
.9
.5
95.3
4.7
100.0

Valid Percent
65.3
28.2
5.0
1.0
.5
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
65.3
93.6
98.5
99.5
100.0

Table 10 Frequency Distribution of Receptiveness of Implementing an Alcohol/Drug
Policy that Includes Rehabiliation and Job Retention/Recovery
How Receptive to Policy

Valid

Missing
Total

No
Maybe
Yes
Total
999

Frequency
54
97
51
202
10
212

Percent
25.5
45.8
24.1
95.3
4.7
100.0

Valid Percent
26.7
48.0
25.2
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
26.7
74.8
100.0

Table 11 Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Data
Statistics

N

Valid
Missing

Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Mode
Std. Deviation
Variance
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Kurtosis
Std. Error of Kurtosis
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Sum

# Pilots # Aircraft
212
210
0
2
5.63
2.19
.379
.116
3.00
2.00
2
1
5.519
1.678
30.461
2.815
2.191
1.905
.167
.168
5.185
4.402
.333
.334
32
10
1
1
33
11
1194
460

Importance of
D/A Policy
209
3
4.05
.077
4.00
5
1.117
1.248
-1.014
.168
.161
.335
4
1
5
846
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Importance
of Job
How
Retention/
Importance of Recovery How Familiar Receptive to
Policy
Rehab Policy
Policy
w/ HIMS
206
202
202
202
6
10
10
10
3.16
3.12
1.43
.99
.084
.083
.048
.051
3.00
3.00
1.00
1.00
3
3
1
1
1.204
1.178
.682
.723
1.449
1.389
.465
.522
-.184
-.214
1.868
.022
.169
.171
.171
.171
-.634
-.517
4.545
-1.072
.337
.341
.341
.341
4
4
4
2
1
1
1
0
5
5
5
2
650
630
289
199

In the final section, Optional Written Policy Submission, participants were asked
if they were willing to be confidentially contacted by the Principal Investigator to arrange
a convenient way to submit a copy of their written flight operations alcohol/drug policy.
One-hundred and ninety-seven (197) people answered the question and 24 people omitted
the question. One-hundred and sixty (160) (81.2%) people declined to be contacted and
37 (18.8%) people indicated their willingness to be contacted by the PI and to submit a
copy of their policies regarding alcohol and drugs. For those participants agreeing to be
contacted, the survey routed them to a page where they could fill in contact information
for a follow up to the survey.
Inferential Statistics
In structuring the survey instrument, demographic information about the size of
corporate flight operations was collected. However, the Principal Investigator had to
assess which variables accurately defined flight department size in terms of this research
study. Was size the number of pilots, the number of aircraft, aircraft types or a complex
combination? In the free form area in which participants could report their aircraft
type(s) and number of each aircraft, there was a wide variability in how each person
reported or coded the types of aircraft in their flight operation. Additionally, there
currently is no universally accepted practice of coding to identify the size of an aircraft
by its type certification. This variability in interpretation became increasingly
complicated when there were different aircraft types within a flight operation, which was
very commonly reported. Because of this reason, aircraft types were determined to be a
less optimal choice in identifying flight department size.
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Upon reviewing the raw demographic data of number of pilots and number of
aircraft, there was an assumption that there would be a fairly high correlation between
these two factors, i.e., it takes more pilots to fly more airplanes. While this assumption is
not entirely linear, it proved to be fairly accurate with Pearson’s product-moment
correlation value of r(210) = 0.854, p = 0.05. Ultimately it was determined that for this
particular study size would be determined by the number of pilots rather than the number
of aircraft. Valid arguments can be made that leaders regard size as also being a function
of the number of aircraft, size of equipment, or even mission of the operation. However,
this decision to use the number of pilots in the flight operation as a measure of size was
made because this research is centered on the challenges of human factor, rather than of
the aircraft.
Hypothesized Findings
It was hypothesized that an increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots),
importance level of written general alcohol/drug policies, suspicion of and/or actually
addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program
and receptiveness to implementing a policy that included rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery would effect the odds of having a written alcohol/drug policy in place.
Appropriate statistical tests were calculated to test this hypothesis.
The Point-Biserial (rpb) and Phi (Φ) correlations (two-tailed design) for general
alcohol/drug policy and the independent variables were calculated and are reported as
follows:
•

Number of Pilots, rpb(209) = 0.343*, p = 0.05

•

Importance of a Written Alcohol/Drug Policy, rpb(207) = 0.699*, p = 0.05
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•

Suspicion of an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(200) = 0.173*, p = 0.01

•

Actually Addressing an Alcohol/Drug, Φ(200) = 0.102, p = 0.05

•

Familiarity Level with the HIMS Program, rpb(200) = 0.082, p = 0.05

•

Receptiveness to Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(200) =
0.010, p = 0.05
These calculations revealed significance at the α = 0.05 level for the three

independent variables of number of pilots, importance of having a written alcohol/drug
policy and suspicion of an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot. However, for the variables of
actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS
program and receptivity to implementing a rehabilitation and job retention/recovery
policy there was not a significant correlation, therefore we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no effect in these cases.
A logistic regression was performed for these variables. The results showed that
only the number of pilots, p = 0.004 and the level of importance of having this respective
policy, p = 0.000 were of significance. For these variables we reject the null hypothesis
that no effect occurred. Having suspicion of an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot did not
produce a level significance in the regression analysis, thus we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no effect with this variable.
Effect size was also calculated for those variables significantly contributing to
having a written general alcohol/drug policy in place. For every pilot added to the flight
operation the odds of having a written alcohol/drug policy in place increases by 1.4 times.
This finding shows significant contribution of size to whether or not a flight operation has
a written alcohol/drug policy in place. Additionally, for those leaders that increase the
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level of importance (of having a written general alcohol/drug policy) by one unit, the
odds of having a written policy in place increase over six fold. This finding shows a
powerful contribution of the effect of importance to whether or not a flight operation has
a policy in place or not. See Table 12 for the classification table and Table 13 for a
synthesis of the regression analysis of general alcohol/drug policies.
Table 12 Classification for the Prevalence of General Alcohol/Drug Policies
Classification Table a
Predicted

Step 1

Observed
D/A Policy

D/A Policy
No
Yes
46
17
9
127

No
Yes

Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
73.0
93.4
86.9

a. The cut value is .500

Table 13 Regression Analysis for General Alcohol/Drug Policies
Variables in the Equation
Step
a
1

Pilots
ImpDAPolicy
SuspectProb(1)
AddressProb(1)
FamHIMS
RecToPolicy
Constant

B
.306
1.856
-.351
.230
-.135
-.274
-7.034

S.E.
.106
.284
.972
.968
.329
.334
1.392

Wald
8.386
42.823
.131
.056
.169
.672
25.525

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.004
.000
.718
.812
.681
.412
.000

Exp(B)
1.358
6.401
.704
1.258
.874
.760
.001

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pilots, ImpDAPolicy, SuspectProb, AddressProb, FamHIMS,
RecToPolicy.

It was hypothesized that an increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots),
importance level of written rehabilitation policies, suspicion of and/or actually addressing
an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program and
receptiveness to implementing a policy that included rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery would effect the odds of having a rehabilitation policy in place.
Appropriate statistical tests were calculated to test this hypothesis.
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The Point-Biserial (rpb) and Phi (Φ) correlations between written rehabilitation
policy and the independent variables were calculated and are reported as follows:
•

Size (Number of Pilots), rpb(206) = 0.224*, p = 0.05

•

Importance of Having a Written Rehabilitation Policy, rpb(204) = 0.542*, p = 0.05

•

Suspicion of an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.224*, p = 0.05

•

Actually Addressing an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.188*, p = 0.05

•

Familiarity Level with the HIMS Program, rpb(201) = 0.131, p = 0.05

•

Receptiveness to Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(201) =
-0.008, p = 0.05
These calculations revealed significance at the α = 0.05 level for the four

independent variables of number of pilots, importance of having a rehabilitation policy,
suspicion of and actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot. However, for the
variables of familiarity level with the HIMS program and receptivity to implementing a
rehabilitation and job recovery/retention policy there was not a significant correlation,
therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no effect in these cases.
A logistic regression was performed for these variables. The results showed that
only the level of importance of having this respective policy, p = 0.000 was of
significance. For this variable we reject the null hypothesis of no effect. The number of
pilots, suspicion of and actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot did not
produce a level significance in the regression analysis, thus we fail to reject the null
hypothesis of no effect with these variables.
Effect size was also calculated for the importance rating of having a rehabilitation
policy significantly contributing to having a written rehabilitation policy in place. For
48

those leaders that increase the level of importance (of having a written rehabilitation
policy) by one unit, the odds of having a written policy in place increases nearly seven
fold. This finding shows a powerful contribution of the effect of importance to whether
or not a flight operation has this type of policy in place or not. See Table 14 for the
classification table and Table 15 for a synthesis of the regression analysis for
rehabilitation polices.
Table 14 Classification for the Prevalence of Rehabilitation Policies
Classification Table a
Predicted

Step 1

Observed
Rehab Policy

Rehab Policy
No
Yes
150
10
15
25

No
Yes

Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
93.8
62.5
87.5

a. The cut value is .500

Table 15 Regression Analysis for Rehabilitation Policies
Variables in the Equation
Step
a
1

Pilots
SuspectProb(1)
AddressProb(1)
FamHIMS
RecToPolicy
ImpRHBPolicy
Constant

B
.035
.115
-.887
.032
-.125
1.903
-8.126

S.E.
.037
.680
.695
.305
.339
.312
1.403

Wald
.857
.029
1.629
.011
.135
37.133
33.553

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.355
.865
.202
.916
.713
.000
.000

Exp(B)
1.035
1.122
.412
1.033
.883
6.707
.000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pilots, SuspectProb, AddressProb, FamHIMS, RecToPolicy,
ImpRHBPolicy.

It was hypothesized that an increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots),
importance level of written job retention/recovery policies, suspicion of and/or actually
addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program
and receptiveness to implementing a policy that included rehabilitation and job
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retention/recovery would effect the odds of having a written job retention/recovery policy
in place. Appropriate statistical tests were calculated to test this hypothesis.
The Point-Biserial (rpb) and Phi (Φ) correlations between written rehabilitation
policy and the independent variables were calculated and are reported as follows:
•

Number of Pilots, rpb(202) = 0.207*, p = 0.05

•

Importance of Having a Written Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(201) =
0.505*, p = 0.05

•

Suspicion of an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.115, p = 0.05

•

Actually Addressing an Alcohol/Drug Issue, Φ(202) = 0.067, p = 0.05

•

Familiarity Level with the HIMS Program, rpb(201) = 0.082, p = 0.05

•

Receptiveness to Rehabilitation and Job Retention/Recovery Policy, rpb(201) =
-0.021, p = 0.05
These calculations revealed significance at the α = 0.05 level for the two

independent variables of number of pilots and importance of having a job
retention/recovery policy. However, for the variables of suspicion of and actually
addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program
and receptivity to implementing a rehabilitation and job recovery/retention policy there
was not a significant correlation, therefore we fail to reject the null hypothesis in these
cases.
A logistic regression was performed for these significant variables. The results
showed that only the level of importance of having this respective policy, p = 0.000 was
of significance. For this variable we reject the null hypothesis. The number of pilots did
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not produce a level significance in the regression analysis, thus we fail to reject the null
hypothesis with this variables.
Effect size was also calculated for the importance rating of having a job
retention/recovery policy significantly contributing to having a written job
retention/recovery policy in place. For those leaders that increase the level of importance
(of having a written rehabilitation policy) by one unit, the odds of having a written policy
in place increases nine fold. This finding shows a powerful contribution of the effect of
importance to whether or not a flight operation has this type of policy in place or not.
See Table 16 for the classification table and Table 17 for a synthesis of the regression
analysis for job retention/recovery policies.
Table 16 Classification for the Prevalence of Job Retention/Recovery Policies
Classification Table a

Step 1

Observed
Job Retention/Recovery
Policy

Predicted
Job
Retention/Recovery
Policy
No
Yes
162
8
12
18

No
Yes

Overall Percentage

Percentage
Correct
95.3
60.0
90.0

a. The cut value is .500

Table 17 Regression Analysis for Job Retention/Recovery Policies
Variables in the Equation
Step
a
1

Pilots
SuspectProb(1)
AddressProb(1)
FamHIMS
RecToPolicy
ImpJobRetPolicy
Constant

B
.062
-.135
-.181
.005
-.737
2.215
-9.591

S.E.
.039
.779
.795
.377
.407
.384
1.680

Wald
2.457
.030
.052
.000
3.284
33.300
32.592

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.117
.863
.820
.989
.070
.000
.000

Exp(B)
1.063
.874
.834
1.005
.478
9.160
.000

a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Pilots, SuspectProb, AddressProb, FamHIMS, RecToPolicy,
ImpJobRetPolicy.
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Non-hypothesized Findings
In running the statistical correlations for hypothesized data, the PI entered all
variables. The following data derived from these test represents significant, but nonhypothesized findings. This information could formulate the basis for future research.
The number of pilots in the flight operation was found to be statistically
significant when correlated with the following:
•

Importance of having a written alcohol/drug policy, r(209) = 0.317, p = 0.05

•

Importance of having a written rehabilitation policy, r(206) = 0.209, p = 0.05

•

Importance level of written job retention/recovery policy, r(202) = 0.172, p =
0.01

•

Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(203) = 0.227, p
= 0.05

•

Having to address an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation, rpb
(203) = 0.244, p = 0.05

•

Familiarity level with the HIMS program, r(202) = 0.229, p = 0.05

Having a written alcohol/drug policy in place was found to be statistically
significant when correlated with the following:
•

Having a written rehabilitation policy, Φ(203) = 0.311, p = 0.05

•

Importance level of having a written rehabilitation policy, rpb(203) = 0.250, p
= 0.05

•

Having a written job retention/recovery policy, Φ(199) = 0.257, p = 0.05

•

Importance level of written job retention/recovery policy, rpb(199) = 0.222, p
= 0.05
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The importance level of having a written alcohol/drug policy in place was found
to be statistically significant when correlated with the following:
•

Having a written rehabilitation policy, rpb(204) = 0.286, p = 0.05

•

Importance level of having a written rehabilitation policy, r(204) = 0.403, p =
0.05

•

Having a written job retention/recovery policy, rpb(200) = 0.191, p = 0.05

•

Importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy, r(200) =
0.367, p = 0.05

•

Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(201) = 0.210, p
= 0.05

•

Having addressed an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation,
rpb(201) = 0.143, p = 0.01

Having a written rehabilitation policy in place at the flight operation was found to
be statistically significant when correlated with the following:
•

Having a written job retention/recovery policy, Φ(202) = 0.655, p = 0.05

•

Importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy, rpb(201) =
0.444, p = 0.05

The importance level of having a written rehabilitation policy in place was found
to be statistically significant when correlated with the following:
•

Having a written job retention/recovery policy in place, rpb(201) = 0.443, p =
0.05

•

Importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy, r(201) =
0.842, p = 0.05
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•

Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(202) = 0.219, p
= 0.05

•

Familiarity level with HIMS program, r(201) = 0.200, p = 0.05

The importance level of having a written job retention/recovery policy was found
to be statistically significant when correlated with:
•

Having suspected a pilot of having an alcohol/drug issue, rpb(202) = 0.186, p
= 0.05

•

Familiarity with the HIMS program, r(201) = 0.197, p = 0.05

Having suspected a pilot in the operation of having an alcohol/drug issue was
found to be statistically significant when correlated with:
•

Having to address an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation,
Φ(203) = 0.716, p = 0.05

•

Familiarity with the HIMS program, rpb(202) = 0.193, p = 0.05
Having to address an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in the flight operation was

found to be statistically significant when correlated with the Familiarity level of the
HIMS program, rpb(202) = 0.168, p = 0.01.
One statistical correlation observed was particularly large. The correlation for the
suspicion of and actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a pilot was shown to be
Φ(203) = 0.716, p = 0.05. The Principal Investigator was interested to understand the
relationship of these two variables. The Pearson’s chi-square test was performed for
suspicion and addressing alcohol/drug issues. The results revealed a value of χ2(1, N =
203) = 104.133, p = 0.05. The value of χ2 is exceeds the critical value of 3.84 for 1 df at
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the α = 0.05 level, thus it has been concluded that these variables are not independent of
one another. The results are shown in Tables 18-21 as follows:
Table 18 Crosstabulation for Suspicion *Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues
Suspect D/A Problem * Actual Addressing D/A Problem Crosstabulation

Suspect D/A
Problem

No

Yes

Total

Actual Addressing D/A
Problem
No
Yes
144
9

Count
% within Suspect D/A
Problem
% within Actual
Addressing D/A Problem
% of Total
Count
% within Suspect D/A
Problem
% within Actual
Addressing D/A Problem
% of Total
Count
% within Suspect D/A
Problem
% within Actual
Addressing D/A Problem
% of Total

Total
153

94.1%

5.9%

100.0%

92.3%

19.1%

75.4%

70.9%
12

4.4%
38

75.4%
50

24.0%

76.0%

100.0%

7.7%

80.9%

24.6%

5.9%
156

18.7%
47

24.6%
203

76.8%

23.2%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

100.0%

76.8%

23.2%

100.0%

Table 19 Chi-Square Tests for Suspicion * Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues
Chi-Square Tests

Pearson Chi-Square
Continuity Correctiona
Likelihood Ratio
Fisher's Exact Test
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
104.133b
100.230
96.127
103.620

Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
.000
.000
.000

df
1
1
1
1

Exact Sig.
(2-sided)

Exact Sig.
(1-sided)

.000

.000

.000

203
a. Computed only for a 2x2 table
b. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 11.
58.
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Table 20 Measures of Association for Suspicion * Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues
Symmetric Measures

Nominal by
Nominal
Interval by Interval
Ordinal by Ordinal
N of Valid Cases

Phi
Cramer's V
Pearson's R
Spearman Correlation

Value
.716
.716
.716
.716
203

Asymp.
Std. Errora

.058
.058

Approx. Tb

14.550
14.550

Approx. Sig.
.000
.000
.000c
.000c

a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.
c. Based on normal approximation.

Table 21 Risk Estimates for Suspicion * Addressing Alcohol/Drug Issues
Risk Estimate
95% Confidence
Interval
Lower
Upper

Value
Odds Ratio for Suspect
D/A Problem (No / Yes)
For cohort Actual
Addressing D/A
Problem = No
For cohort Actual
Addressing D/A
Problem = Yes
N of Valid Cases

50.667

19.886

129.093

3.922

2.391

6.432

.077

.040

.149
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Qualitative Findings
Free Form Discussion
The study expected to find a high prevalence of common attitudes regarding the
existence and importance of alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery) policies. These attitudes included two main areas: Zero Tolerance
and the Moral Model of Addiction.
In the qualitative portion of the survey, respondents were given the opportunity to
expound upon their quantitative answers. Four sections of the survey asked the
participants to answer in a free form format the question: Why or Why Not?
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In the first three sections, the why or why not question followed a finite question
that asked the flight department leader to rate the level of importance of having a certain
type of policy in place. First, the participants were asked to rate how important it is for
corporate flight operations to have a written Alcohol and Drug policy, and then they were
asked to respond to the question: Why or Why Not? Eighty (80) people gave free form
responses to this first question. A great majority of people felt that having a written
alcohol and drug policy in place was either important or very important in order to
establish clear cut guidelines, crewmember expectations, define the consequences of
certain behavior to eliminate subjectivity, misunderstanding and reduce risk. Among
those that felt it was important or very important to have a written policy there was
variability in the content of those policies including some who cited having flexible
guidelines on consumption, zero tolerance, a reiteration of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FARs) and reliance upon the organization’s corporate policy. Many felt
that this type of policy was important for creating a culture of safe operations (for
employees and passengers), protection against litigation, fairness to employees and a
protocol for encountering difficult situations. FARs were cited by a few participants as
containing the minimum standard of operation and that flight operations had to establish
a higher standard in a written form. A few people felt that written alcohol and drug
policies served as deterrents to bad behavior. Several respondents felt that alcohol and
drug policies were critical for larger corporate flight operations but were unnecessary for
small flight operations.
Alternatively, the minority of respondents felt that written policies were either
unimportant, minorly important or were positioned neutrally on the subject. Counter to
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the majority, many respondents felt that the FARs had established the guideline on the
issue of alcohol and drugs, so no additional written policy was required. However, like
those that felt that written policies were important they too felt as though size of the flight
operation was a factor in determining whether or not an alcohol and drug policy was
warranted. Many leaders went on to indicate that their particular operation was in fact
small enough that should an issue occur, they would be aware immediately, as they also
act as full-time flight crew members. Some participants specified that a written policy
was not needed in the flight operation as they had never encountered any issue with
alcohol or drugs. A handful of these people went on to say that issues with alcohol and
drugs very rarely exist in the business aviation sector and that this community should not
have to write policies for the lowest common denominator. Participants also noted their
hiring practices, screening processes and sound judgment in place allowed them to only
hire people who did not have any issues with alcohol or drugs, therefore eliminating the
need for a written policy. Some participants indicated they did not have written policies
in place regarding alcohol and drugs because it would impose more regulation, additional
paperwork and further legal constraints. Finally, some leaders indicated that their
operation did not have a written flight operations policy for alcohol and drugs because the
format was either, verbal, memo style, or deference to their organization’s corporate
policy which in many cases exceeded that of the FARs.
Next, participants were asked to rate how important it is for corporate flight
operations to have a written alcohol/drug policy that addressed rehabilitation for those
flight crew members who had identified as having an issue, and then they were asked to
respond to the question: Why or Why Not? Seventy-nine (79) people gave free form
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responses to this qualitative question. Overwhelmingly the respondents to this question,
regardless of how they rated the importance of having a written rehabilitation policy,
gave answers that indicated significant influence from the parent corporation. Some had
a written departmental policy that reiterated the parent corporation’s policy while others
relied solely upon the corporate policy. Still others indicated that if a policy were to be
put in place, that policy must be reflective of the corporation’s philosophy about
rehabilitation of its employees. These people expressed concern regarding discrimination
and equity of treatment for all employees of the organization, regardless of job duty. For
those who discussed the corporation’s policy, there was variability in importance ratings
and indication of “having” a written policy in place. A few respondents even noted they
were unsure if the question referred to departmental or corporate policy. However, there
is an indication from this qualitative information that even those who have a zero
tolerance policy or general operating philosophy are influenced heavily by the parent
organization. In several cases, respondents indicated that having a written policy is not
only dependent upon the organization but by the perception of safety from the
passengers. In most cases the passengers of corporate flight operations are executive
officers of the organization or key stakeholders in the company - the very people who set
the tone for the entire business.
For those who indicated that a written rehabilitation policy was in place and the
rating was important or very important, these people cited that having a rehabilitation
policy would produce a better outcome for both the individual and organization. Many
felt that such a policy clarified the position of the organization or department, whether it
was a policy of zero tolerance, comprehensive rehabilitation or rehabilitation under
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specific circumstances or conditions. For some, a policy allows people to more easily
come forward with an issue knowing that they would be helped and that this ultimately
reduced risk and improved safety in the flight operation. A few leaders indicated that any
addiction should be treated as a medical issue, congruent with the disease model of
addiction.
Again, the size of the flight operation seemed to be an important factor for these
leaders. Regardless of how leaders rated the importance of having a written rehabilitation
policy, many felt that having a written rehabilitation policy was a function of size. In
general, people felt that small organizations did not need to have a written rehabilitation
policy, but larger flight operations did need such a policy.
For those who rated having a written rehabilitation policy as being minorly
important or unimportant, some felt that decision making flexibility and capability
resided in intentionally operating without having a rehabilitation policy, so as to allow
each case to be treated individually. But other respondents indicated that they did not
have a policy because it was not the organization’s responsibility to provide this type of
assistance. Most expanded their statements to note that the organization could not afford
the cost of rehabilitation, noting the liability, financial exposure and numerous costs of
doing so. These costs, particularly for the smaller organization come from direct from
the rehabilitation itself and absence of the crewmember, but also in terms of indirect costs
such as employee morale and passenger’s perception of safety.
Comments of a few leaders reflected a sentiment about crewmembers that
experience problems with alcohol and drugs compromise safety and therefore are
undeserving of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation for crewmembers is no panacea for the
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flight department; leaders cited poor success rates for rehabilitation, failure to address
underlying behavioral issues and the potential for these crewmembers to attend rehab
only for the purpose of getting their jobs back, not to really change. However, a few
participants were open to the idea of helping employees to receive rehabilitation but they
also said the careers of these people would be impacted by such a decision. Some felt
that the obligation of the organization ended at rehabilitation, others felt that under
certain perimeters a person could return to a non-flying duty. Finally, a couple of
participants indicated that a rehabilitation policy was unnecessary because business
aviation very rarely has a crewmember with an alcohol or drugs issue.
In the third series of questions, participants were asked to rate how important it is
for corporate flight operations to have a written alcohol/drug policy that addressed job
retention/recovery for those flight crew members who had identified as having an issue,
and then they were asked to respond to the question: Why or Why Not? Seventy (70)
people gave free form responses to this qualitative question. The vast majority of
respondents reiterated their comments about rehabilitation, indicating that most leaders
did not distinguish a significant difference between rehabilitation and job recovery. The
commentary followed similar content, with parent corporate policy being cited as the
topic most often discussed. Again, regardless of how the participant had rated the
importance of having a written policy, the corporate policy was important. Secondarily,
many people cited a zero tolerance policy which included termination of an employee
that presented with an alcohol or drug issue, independent of importance rating that
spanned the range of the scale.
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For those who indicated having a written job retention/recovery policy in place
was important, commentary suggested that many felt that a policy clarified the position of
the organization, set the standards of practice and consequences of behavior. Some also
felt that a job retention policy reduced the fear of admitting a problem, therefore reducing
risk to safety. Others noted that having a job retention policy was the right thing to do
and that alcoholism was a disease, like other medical concerns. However, while some
may have rated the importance of such a policy as high there was still an opinion that for
small operations this type of policy was not needed or not practical, but critical for larger
flight operations.
For those who noted a neutrally rated importance of have a written job
retention/recovery policy, several indicated that having such a policy would have to be
dictated by the corporation and/or their passengers. Some indicated that job
retention/recovery must be accompanied with limitations and stipulations. Limitations
and stipulations included specific amounts of sobriety time or proof of success, only one
return to work opportunity, latitude to reapply for job when a medical certificate was
obtained and return to a non-flying duty.
Many participants that indicated a written job retention/recovery policy was
minorly important or unimportant felt having such a policy would limit the decision
making in their operation and would infringe upon the leader’s ability to treat each case
individually. Some noted that hiring practices superseded the need to have a job
retention/recovery policy because this practice eliminated the chance of even hiring a
person with alcohol/drug issues. Finally, a few people noted that especially in small
operations with limited resources the cost was too high to “hold a spot” for the recovering
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pilot when there were so many well-qualified pilots available without alcohol or drug
issues.
Participants were asked whether their flight operation would consider instituting a
written alcohol/drug policy for the rehabilitation and job retention/recovery of pilots if a
proven, successful template was provided. This yes/no/maybe question was then
followed with an opportunity to answer the free form question: Why or Why Not?
Ninety-four (94) survey participants discussed their position on this subject. For those
that answered with yes or maybe indicated that they would consider such a policy with
reasons similar to previous written statements. Corporate policy position on the subject
of alcohol and drugs, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery heavily influenced the
dialogue expressed. Some felt that having a proven and successful template available
was a good resource, but others felt that corporate policy met their present needs in this
area. However, participants also felt that that their corporate policy did not cover all the
needs of airmen. Many went on to say that any policy would have to compliment their
organization’s current directive, must gain approval at the corporate level and would need
to contain non-discriminatory and equitable practices. One participant agreed that such a
policy would codify their corporate policy. Some participants expressed the desire for
such a policy template in order to obtain needed guidance to initiate such protocol,
improvement in current policies, establish good business practices that were driven by
sound data driven academic research. Many leaders articulated a desire to help people
and to have a structure for keeping good employees in the flight operation if possible.
Of course some leaders were more skeptical in their commentary, but still
indicated they would be willing to investigate the option. Some still thought their
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operation was too small but that if an issue ever arose, they would want to know where to
seek assistance. Others questioned how having such a policy would affect the morale of
other employees and the integrity of their operation. Some felt that each case would need
to be considered individually, and that since rehabilitation did not guarantee success,
more stringent monitoring would need to be in place.
Finally, there were those respondents who indicated they would not consider such
a policy because the risk was simply too high. Many noted that a policy was already in
place, corporate or otherwise. Zero tolerance for most flight department leaders was
cited either in official policy form or general unwritten practice. For some, hurdles to the
approval of such a policy with the corporate Legal, Human Resources, Executive and
passenger level was too great to consider. Leaders again expressed hiring practices that
eliminated the need for such a written policy and the desire to retain the right to treat each
situation on a case by case basis. Others felt it was unnecessary to consider such a policy
because their organization did not have a problem with alcohol or drugs, it was not the
corporation’s responsibility and rehabilitation does not work. But again, many cited
issues with limited resources as a function of their flight operation’s size. One such
participant summed this up with the simple response: Life experience. Little Resources.
Written Policy Submissions
Upon reviewing the content of written policies of FAR Part 91 flight operations,
researchers primarily expected to see policies that were a reiteration and expansion of
FAA regulatory guidelines. Some policies, it was expected would contain guidance on
the use of substances and outline the consequences of this use outside of these guidelines.
It was speculated that contained within these policies there would be references to drug
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testing programs, particularly in conjunction with aircraft incidents and accidents.
Finally, the PI anticipated finding larger flight operations that had more robust and
comprehensive policies in comparison to their smaller counterparts.
Twenty-three (23) corporate flight operations submitted copies of alcohol and
drug policies. Some leaders submitted flight department policies, but four leaders
included or only presented the organizational policy. In reviewing the content of the
policies, there was considerable variability in the scope of items addressed in these
policies. For example, two operations submitted a copy of their organizations extensive
drug testing policy for all company employees, whereas other flight operations submitted
policies that contained two short paragraphs addressing the use of substances by flight
personnel. However, regardless of content many of these policies had.
The wording and structure of many of the policies submitted were extremely
similar. The most commonly occurring characteristics of these policies referenced
compliance of FAR 91.17. Many reiterated the language of this regulation, but expanded
the time frame of abstinence of alcohol before performing flight duties from 8 hours to 12
hours, while some expanded to 10 hours. Many policies also mentioned that crew
members should not be under the influence of alcohol or any psychoactive substance
while performing aviation duties. More specifically, some policies included a time frame
(e.g., 8 hours) after being under the influence of any substance. Some operations noted
that airmen were to not exceed a BAC level of 0.04 by weight. A few policies included
the duty of pilots, to deny carriage of persons who are intoxicated or under the influence
of drugs.
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Various policies broadened the terms of their flight operation’s policies to include
a limitation on the consumption of alcohol in the hours proceeding the abstinence period.
In general, these types of policies were worded as such: Moderate consumption or no
excessive consumption of alcoholic beverages in 6-24 hours prior to the abstinence
period prior to duty or standby. One notable policy directly addressed “under the
influence” in discussing the elimination of alcohol from the body and its residual effects,
noting that for some effects could last as long as 72 hours. A couple of policies noted a
specific time of day (0800-1700) that alcohol could not be consumed during standby
duty. Alternatively, others illustrated no consumption while on duty or standby duty.
Still others noted a policy that specified no consumption of alcohol on non-flying days
when away from home base, or on a Remain Overnight (RON) during normal business
hours.
A few departments included policies that noted their organization indicated
alcohol was not to be consumed on company property or while in uniform. Some went
further in saying that abuse of alcohol to the extent that affects good judgment or reflects
negatively on what a professional flight crew member should be is grounds for
termination. A selection of flight departments had policies that required crew members
to remove themselves from duty if they thought their performance would be affected as a
result of alcohol use.
Similarly, Over the Counter (OTC) and prescribed drugs were referenced in many
policies. In particular, several policies noted the unintended yet detrimental effect of
OTC drugs on flight performance. These policies left the determination of fitness for
duty to the crew member taking the medication. In those cases where the crew member
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was unsure of the effects of medication on flight performance, the airman was to consult
his/her private physician or Aviation Medical Examiner (AME). The policies specified
that a private physician must be informed of job duty and specifically asked how
medications will affect flight performance. In some cases, the policy required that all
medications, prescription or non-prescription must be approved by an AME. In other
cases, the policy required that all prescription and OTC medications be reported to the
Director of Aviation or Chief Pilot. In singular cases, policies documented that OTC
drugs could not be used while on duty or could be used under certain conditions. These
conditions included the use of non-drowsy OTC varieties provided they were not
masking underlying problems that interfere with flight duties or use not to exceed a
specific time (12-24 hours) prior to duty. One policy detailed the consequence of
habitual use of OTC medication was grounds for relief from flight duties and another
indicated that reporting for duty under the influence of OTC drugs was grounds for
termination. Finally, one policy referenced the intentional misuse of prescription drugs
was grounds for termination.
While the scope of this study did not include use of tobacco products, a handful of
policies referenced the use of this substance. Three flight operations policies stated that
smoking was prohibited on board company aircraft and on company premises, except in
designated areas. Some even detailed that smoking was not allow with in a certain
distance (e.g., 300 feet) of an airplane. One policy mentioned that the use of tobacco
products by crew members was highly discouraged. Future studies could examine the
inclusion of tobacco products in substance policies.
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Several flight departments submitted policies that recorded an overall
commitment to a drug free workplace. In these cases this message came directly from the
organizational policy, rather than a departmental level policy. Substantially fewer flight
departments had policies that separately addressed illicit drugs or controlled substances.
Some of these policies included a disclaimer reiterating that it was unlawful to use,
manufacture, distribute, dispense, sell or possess illegal drugs. Others stated that on
board aircraft there was to be no carriage of narcotics, illicit drugs, marijuana,
depressants or stimulant substances according to federal and state statues. Most policies
simply stated that use or possession of illegal drugs was grounds for termination. One
policy declared that suspicion of use in connection to flight duties would result in drug
testing.
Drug testing programs and policies while they are beyond the scope of this
particular study must be mentioned because of their interrelationship with drug and
alcohol policies. Two flight operations submitted testing programs as the sole policy
upon which the department and/or company relied. However other leaders submitted
flight operations and company policies that referenced testing, some of which detailed
when and under which circumstances testing would be conducted. The most frequently
occurring types of testing referenced were reasonable suspicion, pre-employment, post
accident/incident and random selection for those in safety sensitive positions. Additional
circumstances referenced for which crew members could be tested were in accordance
with the FAA drug testing program or at the request of the FAA Administrator, at the
request of law enforcement, for any reason deemed necessary, substance related arrests,
arrests for motor vehicle violations and in conjunction with scheduled FAA medical
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exams. Many policies indicated that positive tests would result in termination. Finally,
two additional terms under which crew members could be subject to testing included in
conjunction with a documented recovery program and return to work from substance
abuse treatment.
The vast majority of the policies submitted for review had no reference to
recovery programs and return to work. However, one company wide policy did indicate
a voluntary disclosure program under which disciplinary action would not be taken for
first time participants. Non-paid leave of 14 days was granted, testing would occur after
this time with return to work. In this program the participant is required to submit to 3
years of random testing, should a positive test be revealed the employee is terminated.
One departmental policy referenced the company’s assistance program however the
assistance program details were not given.
As a final component to alcohol and drug policies, a limited number of flight
department policies required reporting procedures to the Director of Aviation or Chief
Pilot. These reports included warnings, alleged or actual violations of the FARs. A
couple of policies specified reporting to aviation leader the occurrence of any infraction
that might jeopardize an airman’s license or medical certificate, such as a Driving Under
the Influence (DUI) or Driving While Intoxicated (DWI). No further mention was made
of the procedure beyond reporting.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS
Review
The purpose of this research study was to gather information regarding the current
nature of flight departmental alcohol and drug policies within the corporate/executive
aviation community that operate under Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations
(FARs). The design of this study was structured in order to gain insight about the
magnitude and content of general alcohol and drug, rehabiliation and job retention and
reovery policies, attitudes held, experience with and familiarity with particular resources
for alcohol/drug issues and finally receptiveness to implementing policy. Researchers
attempted to uncover factors that may drive flight departments to write and put these
policies in place, as they are not mandidated.
The literature available indicates that the prevalence of alcohol and drug abuse
and dependence among airmen is equivalent to that of the general population which is
reported to be 5-8 percent. The disease does not discriminate among professions,
socioeconomic classes, gender, age, education levels or other factors (Snyder, 2003).
The FAA acknowledges the value of education, intervention, treatment and return to
flying duties for pilots afflicted by this common, progressive, fatal, but treatable disease.
The FAA has accepted the definition of substance abuse/dependence provided by the
medical community (Morse, 1992). Aviation leaders and airmen facing alcohol and drug
issues in the flight operation have access to resources through the Human Intervention
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Motivation Study (HIMS) program, a jointly administered program between the FAA,
management and medical representatives for the intervention, rehabilitation and job
retention/recovery of those airmen facing substance issues.
The prevalence, content of alcohol/drug policies, as well as the attitudes of
managers of international, commercial air carriers was studied in 1997 by Christopher
Cook (Cook, 1997). This study followed his line of research to explore the attitudes and
policies of corporate/executive flight operations, analyzing questionnaire data and
submitted policies.
Our current study found that 68 percent of corporate/executive operators had
written, general alcohol/drug policies, 20 percent had rehabilitation and 15 percent had
job retention/recovery policies in place. Overall, leaders of these operations reported
general alcohol/drug policies were important or very important at a rate 72 percent.
However, importance ratings for rehabilitation and job retention/recovery policies
reported were normal distributed across the five point scale, with the highest
concentrations of ratings being neutral. Statistical tests found that the importance of the
respective types of policies reported by leaders was a key factor in determining whether
or not these types of policies were in place. For of each incremental increase in the
importance rating of the respective policy the odds of having that policy in place
increased by six times for general alcohol/drug, seven times for rehabilitation and nine
times for job retention/recovery. Flight department size was speculated by researchers
and frequently discussed by leaders as a primary factor in determining the importance of
and the existence of these policies in the operation. The study found the size of the flight
department, in terms of the number of pilots was a moderate factor determining whether
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or not the general alcohol/drug policy was in place. Statistical tests revealed that for each
pilot added to the flight operation the odds of having a general alcohol/drug policy in
place increased by 1.4 times. An important finding revealed that many leaders had direct
experience of suspecting and addressing alcohol/drug issues with pilots. The research
found that 24 percent of flight department leader’s have suspected alcohol/drug issues
with pilots and 22 percent have actually addressed these issues. However, researchers
found that these leaders had little familiarity with the resource available to them to deal
with alcohol/drug issues through the HIMS program. The study found that the bulk, 94
percent of leaders were unfamiliar or somewhat familiar with this program. Finally,
leaders were asked to indicate their receptivity to implementing an alcohol/drug policy
from a proven template that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery.
Researchers found the data to be normally distributed across the three point scale, with
the concentration (48 percent) reported as maybe. The study uncovered in qualitative
analysis of written alcohol/drug policies submitted by these flight operations that the
majority included short narratives reiterating FAA regulatory policy, with minor hourly
adjustments. Survey responses in the free form discussion area primarily reflected
support of zero tolerance policies, but that any written policies in place must be reflective
of their parent organizations directives and philosophy surrounding the issue of
alcohol/drugs.
The rationale behind researching alcohol and drug policies within
corporate/executive flight operations was to create a factual basis for identifying the scale
of the status quo, the potential need for these policies and baseline guidance material for
the creation of further research in this community of aviation. Ultimately, this data
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supports an endeavor to promote the education of industry professionals and flight
operations affected by substance abuse and dependence issues. Futhermore, this research
study supports the business aviation industry’s goal of achieving increased safety through
industry best practices.
Conclusions of Research Questions and Hypothesis
The size of the flight operation for the purposes of this research study was
determined to be the number of pilots. There are several statistics that are meaningful for
the number of pilots reported. First, the range of the number of pilots was between 1 and
33, with a (M = 5.63, SD = 5.519) or 6 pilots per operation. The outlier of the flight
department reporting 33 pilots has a skewing effect on the mean. For this reason, the
statistics Mo = 2 and Mdn = 3 have been selected as more meaningful representations of
the number of pilots within corporate/executive flight operations. Interestingly, the
number of aircraft reported while it too experienced an outlier of 11 aircraft from one
operation the mean was not impacted as dramatically. A range of 1-11 aircraft were
reported a (M = 2.19, SD = 1.678) or 2 aircraft per operation. The Mo = 1 and the Mdn =
2 were reported for the number of aircraft per operation. Both the number of pilots and
number of aircraft were positively skewed, indicating that bulk of corporate/executive
flight operations are relatively small in composition.
The study posed the research question: What is the prevalence of written
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policies for pilots in
place? Overwhelmingly, flight departments reported that they did have general
alcohol/drug policies in place in their operations. In fact, 68 percent of
corporate/executive flight operations have these types of policies. Alternatively, the
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balance shifts when discussing rehabilitation and job retention/recovery policies.
Leader’s reported that 20 percent have rehabilitation policies and 15 percent have job
retention/recovery policies in place.
The research study posed the research question: How important are having written
alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery) policies for pilots in
place to leaders? Figure 1 represents the distribution of percentages among flight
operations’ reported level of importance of each of the policies.
Figure 1

Distribution of Importance Level Percentages for Type of Alcohol/Drug
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As the chart indicates, the distribution of importance levels for general
alcohol/drug policies is negatively skewed. The data reported shows that the majority of
flight department leaders feel that these policies are either Important or Very Important;
totaling 72 percent. Alternatively, the distribution of data for both rehabilitation and job
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retention/recovery programs appears to be more evenly distributed among the levels of
importance, with a concentration in the Neutral category.
The study posed the research question: What is the prevalence of leaders’
suspicion of and/or addressing alcohol/drug issues with pilots? The descriptive data of
these two factors shows that one-quarter of the sample or 24 percent of leaders have
suspected and over one-fifth of the sample or 22 percent have actually had to address an
alcohol/drug issue with a pilot in their flight operation. The prevalence of these findings
was unanticipated by researchers and as a result it was determined that data should be
examined further through statistical analysis. The Pearson’s chi-square test was
performed for suspicion and addressing alcohol/drug issues to uncover the nature of the
relationship between these two variables. The results revealed a value of χ2(1, N = 203)
= 104.133, p = 0.05, which exceeds the critical value of 3.84 for 1 df at the p = 0.05 level,
thus it has been concluded that these variables are not independent of one another.
Meaningful data was obtained from the contingency tables of the chi-square test. What
researchers revealed was that 71 percent of leaders had no experience with suspecting
and addressing alcohol/drug issues with pilots, whereas 19 percent did experience with
both of these issues. However, some leaders (6 percent) had suspected but did not
address alcohol/drug issues and still other leaders (4 percent) had not suspected an
alcohol/drug issue with a pilot, but did have to address this issue.
The study posed the research question: How familiar are leaders with the HIMS
program? Figure 2 shows the distribution of percentages for the familiarity levels among
flight operations.
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Figure 2

Distribution of HIMS Program Familiarity Level Percentages
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As can be seen in Figure 2, the distribution of familiarity levels is positively
skewed. In this case the vast majority or 94 percent of leaders were Unfamiliar and
Somewhat Familiar with the HIMS program. The category Unfamiliar was further
defined in the survey as being, “never heard of the HIMS program” and Somewhat
Familiar as being, “heard of the HIMS program, but don’t know where to obtain program
information”. Flight department leaders clearly need additional information about the
details of HIMS and where to access program information, should they need to access
this resource.
The study posed the research question: How receptive are leaders to
implementing an alcohol/drug policy that includes job retention/recovery and
rehabilitation components? The data obtained regarding the receptiveness to this type of
policy was normally distributed with 27 percent of flight department leader’s indicating
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they would not, 48 percent indicating they might and 25 percent indicating they would
consider such a policy if a proven template was provided.
Finally, the study posed the hypothesized research question: What factors predict
whether or not a flight operation has a written alcohol/drug (general, rehabilitation and
job retention/recovery) policy for pilots in place? Researchers hypothesized that an
increase in the factors of: size (number of pilots), importance level of written general
alcohol/drug policies, suspicion of and/or actually addressing an alcohol/drug issue with a
pilot, familiarity level with the HIMS program and receptiveness to implementing a
policy that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery would effect the odds of
having a written alcohol/drug policy in place. The results of the statistical tests revealed
that most influential factors involved in determining whether or not a flight operation
would have a certain type of policy in place or not was the flight department leader’s
rated importance level of the respective policy. In fact for of each incremental increase in
the importance rating (5 point Likert scale) of the respective policy the odds of having
that policy in place increased by six times for general alcohol/drug, seven times for
rehabilitation and nine times for job retention/recovery. Flight department size was
speculated by researchers and frequently discussed by leaders as a primary factor in
determining the importance of and the existence of these policies in the operation. The
study found that only for general alcohol/drug policies was size a moderate factor
contributing to whether or not the policy was in place. Statistical tests revealed that for
each pilot added to the flight operation the odds of having a general alcohol/drug policy
in place increased by 1.4 times. All other factors were not shown to contribute in a
statistically significant fashion to whether a written policy of any type was in place or

77

not. It was interesting to find these results because researchers believed that the
implementation of written policy could be driven by having direct experience with an
employee who had or might have an issue with alcohol/drugs. Additionally, investigators
thought that for those who were more familiar with the HIMS program would also be
more likely to have a policy in place. What was found is that because the vast majority
of had little knowledge of the HIMS program, not enough raw numbers were seen to
produce an effect in this area. However, researchers reviewed the existence of policies of
those leaders that reported a familiarity level in the median to high range of the 5 point
scale. It was found that 15 respondents rated their familiarity level in this (3-5) range.
Of these 15 leaders, 4 reported having all three written policies (general alcohol/drug,
rehabilitation and job retention/recovery), 2 reported having two of the written policies
(general and rehabilitation), 6 reported having only written general alcohol/drug policy
and 1 indicated that the flight operation had no written policies in place for alcohol/drugs.
Researchers further predicted that the level of receptiveness to implementing a
policy that included rehabilitation and job retention/recovery would affect the odds of
having a written alcohol/drug policy in place. The statistical tests failed to uncover a
relationship between these two variables.
Researchers anticipated uncovering qualitative information from respondents that
supported Zero Tolerance policies and a reiteration of FAR regulations. These two
attributes were discussed most frequently by leaders in the free form section of the
survey. Written alcohol/drug policies submitted tangibly supported the existence of
policies that contained a reiteration or simple expansion of the FAA guidance regarding
alcohol and drugs. The majority of respondents discussed the importance of having
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written general alcohol/drug policies in place. According to these leaders, for crew
members policies function to establish clear guidelines; set expectations; indicate
consequences of behavior; eliminate subjectivity, misunderstanding and reduce risk.
However, upon review of the written policies submitted, these policies did not contain
information that supported the reasons given by leaders for policies to be in place. There
appears to be a disparity between the reported goals of policy and the content of policies
currently in place to achieve these goals.
However, some operations do have written policies in place that discuss the
conditions under which use of substances is approved and unapproved, including standby
duty. But from the wording of these policies, there is little continuity between
organizations regarding what is defined as standby duty and duty time in this sector.
Likely, the culture of each flight operation has a clear definition of these terms, but a
broad industry analysis is challenging when basic terms do not have a singular meaning
and those terms are not explicitly defined or contained in the policy. More information is
required regarding cultural definitions of the terms duty, standby duty and the context of
each flight departments’ operations.
It has been established throughout the qualitative findings that there is great
variability in the content of policies regarding substance use, misuse, abuse and
dependence policies and testing procedures. More importantly we have gained insight
that there is also a great disparity in the understanding of what each of these components
(use, misuse, abuse, dependence and testing) mean. Terms are used interchangeably
adding to the confusion for leaders.
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A selection of flight departments had policies that required crew members to
remove themselves from duty if they thought their performance would be affected as a
result of alcohol use. It is interesting to note that these particular policies did not indicate
any consequences, positive or negative of self-removal from flight duty.
Qualitative discussion information gathered throughout the survey from leader’s
suggested that having written policies in place was a function of the size of the flight
operation. The statistical analyses performed support this perspective for general
alcohol/drug policies. For each pilot added to the operation, the odds of having a written
general alcohol/drug policy in place increases six times. However, the study failed to
measure of significant effect of the size of the operation to written policies for
rehabilitation and job retention/recovery of pilots. In fact, both the prevalence of these
types of policies, discussion, and analysis of written documents suggest that these two
sectors of policy are deferred to the parent corporation. Deferring policy guidance to the
parent corporation was an important topic discussed by leaders in the discussion section.
Frequently, flight department managers stated that should written alcohol/drug policies
be amended or instituted that they must be reflective of the corporation’s current
directives, operating philosophy in this area for the equity of employee treatment. In this
way, statements are reflective of functional corporate officers.
Limitations of Study
This study was limited by accessibility to the entire population of FAR Part 91
corporate/executive flight operations. The most representative subpopulation of these
operators was identified as being members of NBAA. This organization represents
approximately 60 percent of this population. The study was further limited by available
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email addresses for flight department leaders located in the 2006 NBAA Membership
Directory. As a result, the results and finding of this study may not be attributable to the
entire population of FAR Part 91 corporate/executive flight operations.
Survey questions were carefully structured and were analyzed for content validity
by experts. The survey instrument included three dichotomous yes/no questions
regarding the existence of written (general, rehabilitation and job retention/recovery)
alcohol/drug policies. These questions were structured in such a way as to give the
survey participant the flexibility to answer affirmatively that the flight department had
some form written alcohol and drug policy, when a policy existed at corporate level. In
the free form area, participants indicated that this flexibility gave way to an unanticipated
variability in interpretation. For some respondents, the understanding of these questions
was that the flight department must have its own separate, written policies apart from the
organization. Thus, some participants answered yes and some answered no to having
such policies when the parent company had a policy that covered employees in the flight
operation. This also created a trickle down effect in the variability of importance ratings
(of having such a policy). Some indicated that having a policy was unimportant because
the parent already covered them, whereas others indicated it was very important because
corporate policy dictated it.
Recommendations
This research was a quasi-replicative study based upon the 1997 work of
Christopher Cook. In his findings, Cook concluded that many of the questions regarding
preventative policies were unclear and misunderstood because participants failed to
understand the differences between proactive and reactive alcohol and drug policies.
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While this study took great measures to use his results in structuring the survey
instrument, researchers still have much room for improvement to clarify the intent of
questions. Additional research should take into consideration distinguishing between
corporate policy and departmental policy in the survey instrument. The survey used
could be clarified by expanding the answer options to include the corporate policy,
departmental policy, and both. Future studies could request that both the flight
operations and corporate policies be submitted for a qualitative analysis.
There was speculation by researchers that a relatively high correlation would be
seen between participants that had suspected a pilot of having an alcohol or drug issue
and actually addressing that issue. As predicted there was a high correlation, but not 100
percent. There were those leaders who did suspect but then did not address the substance
issue for some reason. Additional research could extend this line of questioning to
identify qualitatively the reasons behind why a leader did not intervene, when they had
suspicion. Perhaps there is a relationship to these reasons and the existence of guidance,
policy and philosophy. There were those leaders too that did not suspect but did have to
address an alcohol or drug issue. Additional research could also extend the line of
questioning to identify qualitatively the context in which a leader might have to address
an alcohol or drug issue with a crew member without warning. Research could
potentially uncover how leaders handled these situations, with what type of assistance,
what the outcomes were and what might be done differently in the future to mitigate the
exposure to risk.
Participants were asked to indicate whether or not they had ever had suspicion
that a pilot in their operation had an issue with alcohol or drugs this was asked as a
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simple yes or no question. The sensitivity of this question did not account for those flight
department leaders that potentially may have encountered more than one pilot with an
issue with alcohol or drugs. When answering yes to this question leaders could have had
multiple pilots that they suspected of having an alcohol or drug issue. This question did
not account for rate of suspicion. The structure of question insensitivity also extends to
the question asked of participants who answered yes to the question regarding having
actually addressed an alcohol or drug issue with pilots in their flight operation. It is
recommended that future research take into account that flight department leaders may
have encountered more than one crew member with a substance issue. Future surveys
should ask leaders to identify how many different people they have suspected and also
how many different people they have addressed. Collecting the rate with which leaders
have experienced these issues is very important.
Two participants referenced having had experience extending help to a pilot that
had an alcohol or drug issue. These two leaders indicated that the help that was extended
was a failure and that this experience had influenced their opinions and policy guidance
about alcohol and drugs. But what constitutes failure? If the policy was designed to give
a person an opportunity to take advantage of rehabilitation and job retention/recovery,
maintain safety by reducing risk to the flight operations and protect assets but yet the
person did not meet the criteria, the policy did not fail. Likely the person did not fail
either. Recovery and readiness for change is not black and white as we once thought,
rather it is more likened to a continuum. Yes, it is true that the people referenced by
these leaders did not meet the flight operation or corporation’s criteria, but the
opportunity could have been enough to start this person on the journey of recovery and
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even been the seed that would save this person’s life. What is the role of the policy? The
role of the policy can be punitive, it can be risk mitigation, it can be guidance of how to
handle such events, and it can even be a structure for saving lives. The motivation for
creating such a policy varies from flight operation to flight operation and is heavily
influence by corporate policy and philosophy in this area. It is entirely possible that the
policy did not fail either, safeguarding people and assets from harm. However, there
exists and opportunity to explore the details of these anecdotal stories so that we have a
better understanding of how policies did or did not accomplish the goal. Additionally,
there exists an opportunity for researchers to explore longitudinally the progress or
degradation of airmen that have referred to help offered by the employer. Furthermore
researchers could explore the components, scope and quality of help provided or
available to airmen.
In the qualitative data, some participants reference reliance upon their Employee
Assistance Programs (EAP). Future studies could structure questions to allow
participants to indicate if their organization or flight operation provided access to an EAP
program encompassing of alcohol and drug issues. This information could provide
additional robustness in what resources corporate flight operations have at their disposal.
This information could also identify the size or type of organization that extends this
benefit to its employees and those who do not. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many
EAP programs are unaware of the FAA requirements that need to be met for pilots to
return to service. As a result, numerous additional internal and external resources are
required for airmen. This lack of knowledge extends to many flight department leaders
unaware of the FAA’s requirements to return an airman to duty through a Special
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Issuance Medical Certificate. Data collected from the question posed in this survey
asking participants to rate their familiarity with the HIMS program gives us a glimpse
into this issue. Alternatively, flight department leaders could be relatively unfamiliar
with the resources available through the company’s EAP program. Additional research
could investigate flight department leader’s understanding of the resources available to
them inside their own organizations.
Although this study did not gain access to many parent company policies to which
many flight departments defer, enough information was gathered to know that more
research must be conducted. It is speculated that the organization may grant flight
crewmembers unbiased access to assistant programs. However, most EAP
representatives and company personnel including the flight department leader are
unaware of the FAA’s medical requirements for returning someone to duty. Again this is
an opportunity for aviation leaders to learn how they may help both the employee and the
organization by educating upwards. In order for the process to work, it must include
additional information gathering and sharing from flight operations, the company and
potentially the organization’s EAP. The process must be a collaborative establishment of
policies that aid the airman while adhering to the cultural standards of the parent
organization.
In verbal conversations with some of the survey participants, leaders indicated
that they had written an alcohol and drug policy for their flight operation as a result of
seeking International Standard for Business Aircraft Operations (IS-BAO) certification.
Obtaining IS-BAO certification reflects the highest level of standardized safety practices
and policies created by the International Business Aviation Council (IBAC).
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Implementation of an alcohol and drug policy has become a recommend practice by some
IS-BAO consultants, but is not required to obtain IS-BAO certification. The wording of
the written alcohol/drug policies were so similar that it is suspected a template form may
have been used. This wording could have been recommended by IS-BAO consultants.
Further research is needed to determine how the language of these policies was obtained.
Future research could analyze the scope and robustness of the recommended alcohol and
drug policy. It further gives an opportunity to review the IS-BAO process and where
substance policies fall with regard to making inclusion a required process for
certification. The standard practice of some IS-BAO consultants to recommend inclusion
of a substance policy within flight operations manuals uncovers the fact that this study
did not ask participants to identify what requirement or event prompted the
implementation of a particular alcohol and drug policy. This study did not ask
participants to indicate when a policy was initiated, if the policy had been amended or
updated. The scope of this study did not collect information about whether the policy
was implemented by the leader, if it was inherited from a previous leader or boss and if
the policy was voluntarily initiated or mandated. These questions could be posed in a
future study.
Individual leaders each come to the table with biases and prior experiences inside
and out of the workplace that shape attitudes, opinions and behavior both in how people
are treated and in the actions or inactions that leaders take to develop policies that seem
applicable or important for a particular environment. The resources and scope of this
research project did not address (both external policy influencing factors and internal
policy influencing factors) all the life experiences that influence attitudes and ultimately
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policy (motivators). Future research could probe leaders regarding experiences external
to the work environment that influenced 1) Having a policy (of any level) and 2)
Importance ratings of having a policy (of any level). Next leaders could be asked they
created or initiated the implementation of a policy or if it was inherited. Finally,
researchers could inquire about the driving factor for policy formation (corporate
influence, IS-BAO certification, internal and external personal experiences, existence of
an alcohol/drug issue within flight operations, or having a policy in another
operation/environment).
Final Discussion
In the process of coordinating the receipt of written policies, several flight
department leaders indicated that their operational policies were currently lean and had
room for improvement. Others indicated that written policies were intentionally left
vague, so as to allow for the leader to exercise judgment based on individual
circumstances. Leaders indicated in the discussion section of the survey that they would
be able to detect substance abuse/dependencies issues among pilots either in the hiring
process or with their employees. The reality is that these issues can be incredibly hard to
detect even to the trained professional. Written policies that allow for non-punitive selfdisclosure to get help and retain or recover jobs, bring substance abuse and dependence
issues into the open thereby reducing risk and improving safety of flight operations.
For many leaders, the issue of whether or not to have an alcohol and drug policy
in addition to its content, boils down to one of leader control. If one prefers, this can be
recharacterized as freedom of choice vs. responsibility of the lives of others (both your
crews and passengers). Many people responding to this survey indicated that they
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wanted to retain their “right” to treat each situation on an individual basis. There is a
sense through these statements that these people wish to maintain the freedom of choice
and control in their flight operation to make moral judgments about the extenuating
circumstances surrounding a particular person or issue. Many have a belief system that is
grounded in the Moral Model of addiction, which is that there is some sort of deficit or
corruption in the person who is afflicted. Retaining the “right” to judge the situation is
guise for judgment of person, taking into account all of the “bad” things addicts and
abusers do while under the influence (i.e., nobody is going to come in hear and tell me
how to run MY operation, because I know best.)
From a humanistic perspective, treating people affected by alcohol and drugs on a
case by case basis is admirable on its face; however there is a question as to the
therapeutic nature and motivation for doing so by the leader who wants to retain freedom
of judgment and views policy as a threat. Some challenge this perspective and say that
incorporating a policy is not relinquishing control of the leader’s flight operation, nor
does it limit freedom of choice. Instead it is argued that a responsibility exists to treat
those a leader is responsible for with equally distributed fairness, not potential
discriminatory influences. It is also argued leaders have the responsibility to provide
guidance for those in charge in the event of the leader’s absence regarding what to do to
protect themselves, passengers and the assets of the organization.
Employees that present with alcohol and drug issues regularly make poor
decisions and can exhibit reprehensible behavior. While the medical community
officially recognizes substance abuse and dependency within the context of the disease
model, it is often supremely challenging to separate the behavior of addiction from the
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actual disease. These two components are separate, however intertwined they may be.
When faced with an emotionally charged situation that evoke strong feelings, it is
difficult not be swayed by these emotions. Having a policy in place may help mitigate
the influence of emotionally charged decision making and gives guidance. Just as having
an emergency checklist is critical to proper decision making when an aircraft has an
engine failure, having a robust alcohol and drug policy in place is important for decision
making for the safety of a flight operations personnel. Furthermore, this analogy can be
used in the argument against creating a substance policy because of size or because the
operation has not encountered such an issue. While many flight operations never
experience an engine-out situation, as responsible leader’s and pilots we could rarely
consider flying without an emergency checklist because the flight operation is too small
or because an engine-out had never occurred. Such is the case when considering risk
mitigation for people and assets in critical decision making on the ground through the
construction of substance policies.
The cultural stigmatization and challenges that come with substance abuse and
dependence parallel those of mental illness and in some cases can be dually occurring, or
co-morbid. Kay Redfield Jamison in her memoir, An Unquiet Mind discusses her
struggle with bipolar disorder as a practicing Psychologist. An analogous message for
the airmen who is struggling with substance abuse or dependence can be drawn. She
writes,
“The privilege to practice is exactly that, a privilege; it is not a
right. The real dangers, of course, come about from those clinicians (or,
indeed from those politicians, pilots, businessmen, or other individuals
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responsible for the welfare of others) who – because of the stigma or the
fear of suspension of their privileges or expulsion from medical school,
graduate school, or residency-are hesitant to seek out psychiatric
treatment. Left untreated, or unsupervised, many become ill, endangering
not only their own lives but the lives of others; often, in an attempt to
medicate their own moods, many doctors will also become alcoholics or
drug abusers” (Redfield Jamison, 1995).
The lack of judgment both by the affected airmen and the leaders of flight
operations is pervasive in a work environment culturally steeped in intolerance. As a
result of this intolerance, the industry lacks policy guidance. But ultimately we are not
really talking about the freedom to control one’s flight operation, to exercise individually
tailored judgment, retaining airmen privileges or even careers - we are talking about
saving lives. Policies give us the guidance to follow a checklist of action that protects the
people who have lost the ability to protect themselves. Policies give us the guidance to
protect our passengers, our assets and finally ourselves insulating us from potential
litigious action. At the end of the day, as a leader isn’t that what we are charged with
doing-leading to protect? Because we are leaders, it is not about what I feel personally or
what we want personally, but what is best for all involved.
Jamison goes on to write, “Hospitals and professional organizations need
to acknowledge the extent to which untreated doctors, nurses, and
psychologists present risks to the patients they treat. But they also need to
encourage effective and compassionate treatment and work out guidelines
for safeguards and intelligent, nonpaternalistic supervision. Untreated
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mood disorders result in risks not only to patients, but to the doctors
themselves. Far too many doctors - many of them excellent physicians commit suicide each year” (Redfield Jamison, 1995).
Her message can easily be rewritten for the aviation industry regarding substance
abuse/dependence. Flight Operations and professional aviation organizations need to
acknowledge the extent to which untreated aviators, mechanics, and air traffic controllers
present risks to the people they transport. Untreated substance abuse and dependence
produce resulting risks not only to passengers and assets, but to the afflicted professional
themselves. Far too many airmen are encouraged to hide their battle with substances and
are penalized when seeking help which may lead eventually to death.
Ultimately as clinicians, practitioners, researchers and leaders in the aviation
community we are trying to identify those flight operations lead by those who are ready
and require guidance in creating and changing alcohol and drug policies. There are those
too who are experiencing ambivalence to change and even those who are do not yet
recognize that change may be necessary (may be at risk for having an issue in their flight
operation but do not have any policy or a policy that does not fully support their needs).
Through this examination of the current state of corporate aviation’s alcohol and drug
policies we have gotten closer to gauging those flight operations that may fall into these
categories. We also have a plethora of opportunities for further research to learn more
and increase education in the area of alcohol and drug policies, resources and attitudes.
Combined we have the chance to help an entire aviation community affected by the
growing presence of alcohol and drugs.
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APPENDIX B
SURVEY EMAIL INVITATION
Dear Flight Department Leader,
As a graduate student working on my master’s degree in Aviation at the John D. Odegard
School of Aerospace Sciences at the University of North Dakota, I am seeking your
industry expertise through a survey for my thesis work. This survey has been specifically
designed for your operational environment - Business Aviation.
Your time is extremely valuable. This short survey has been limited to 16 questions,
taking only approximately 10 minutes to complete. Cookies must be enabled on your
computer to take the survey. Please note, your participation and the answers given will
remain entirely confidential.
Your opinion and expertise matter. The purpose of this study is to gain insight into the
nature of air-crew alcohol and drug policies among FAR Part 91 flight operations,
specifically their prevalence and factors influencing policy composition. Your
contribution will provide insight and guidance about voluntary, internal policy
development as well as industry best practices in this particular area. This is your chance
to voice your opinion and share your expertise regarding what the needs of the industry
are regarding departmental air-crew alcohol and drug policies.
Your participation is greatly appreciated. Your invitation to participate in this study will
be valid from October 15-31, 2007. Please click on the following link to complete your
survey now: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx (Corporate Aviation Alcohol/Drug
Policy Survey).
Thank you for your contribution. Should you have any questions about the survey or
encounter any difficulties in completing the survey, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Johnené Vardiman, Graduate Researcher
John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences
University of North Dakota
johnene.vardiman@und.nodak.edu
(940) 565-5048
Please note: If you do not wish to receive further emails from us, please click
https://www.surveymonkey.com/optout.aspx (here), and you will be automatically
removed from our mailing list.
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